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Confrontation Under the  
Marian Statutes 
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR DAVIES 
Robert Kry† 
In Crawford v. Washington, Justice Scalia wrote for a 
seven-Justice majority that the Confrontation Clause prohibits 
admission of an absent witness’s “testimonial” statements 
against a criminal defendant unless the witness is unavailable 
to testify in person and the accused had a prior opportunity for 
cross-examination.1  That holding was based in part on a claim 
that, at the time of the framing, those two conditions governed 
admissibility of pretrial examinations taken under the Marian 
bail and committal statutes.2  Those two statutes—passed 
during the reign of Queen Mary in the sixteenth century—
required justices of the peace to examine felony suspects and 
their accusing witnesses before bailing the suspects or 
committing them to jail to await trial.3  Because those Marian 
examinations4 were a routine feature of felony prosecutions at 
  
 † Associate, Baker Botts LLP.  Law Clerk to Justice Antonin Scalia, 2003-
2004, and Judge Alex Kozinski, 2002-2003.  J.D., Yale Law School, 2002.  The author 
thanks John Beattie, John Langbein, Richard Friedman, Thomas Gallanis, and Scott 
Hemphill for comments on earlier drafts.  As noted, the author served as a clerk to 
Justice Scalia during the term Crawford v. Washington was decided; all views 
expressed, however, are the author’s own. 
 1 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). 
 2 Id. at 46-47. 
 3 1 & 2 Phil. & M., c. 13 (1554); 2 & 3 Phil. & M., c. 10 (1555). 
 4 Although the Marian bail statute also addressed depositions on coroners’ 
inquests, see infra notes 249-56 and accompanying text, I use the terms “Marian 
examination” and “Marian deposition” throughout to refer only to committal 
examinations by justices of the peace.  
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the time the Sixth Amendment was framed, their admissibility 
is relevant to any general theory of the Confrontation Clause.   
If framing-era Marian examinations were conducted ex 
parte, were admissible despite being ex parte, and were 
nonetheless noncontroversial, that would be important 
evidence against Crawford ’s holding.  In his recent article, 
What Did the Framers Know, and When Did They Know It? 
Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington,5 Professor 
Thomas Davies makes those claims.  He argues that 
Crawford ’s historical analysis is flawed because the earliest 
reported English cases stating that the Marian statutes did not 
authorize admission of ex parte examinations were published 
no earlier than May 1789, too late to have been widely 
available to Americans when they drafted the Sixth 
Amendment later that year.6  Davies rejects all English sources 
published after or shortly before the framing and all American 
sources published more than a few years after the framing as 
invalid historical evidence; he finds many of those sources 
ambiguous in any event.7  From earlier sources, he concludes 
that a Marian examination was admissible if the witness was 
unavailable, whether or not there had been an opportunity for 
cross-examination.8  He relies on that conclusion as the basis 
for a series of broad critiques of Crawford and originalism 
generally.9   
This Article responds.  I argue that Crawford is well 
supported by the historical evidence, and that Davies reaches a 
contrary conclusion only because he ignores relevant evidence, 
treats highly ambiguous sources as clearly supporting his view, 
and understates the degree to which post-framing sources 
reject his position.  Contrary to Davies’ argument, there is a 
more than adequate historical basis to conclude that the 
Framers did not believe ex parte committal examinations were 
admissible under the Marian statutes or their state 
equivalents.10 
  
 5 Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did They Know 
It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105 (2005). 
 6 See id. at 159-61. 
 7 See id. at 155, 162-73, 180. 
 8 See id. at 108, 188-89. 
 9 See, e.g., id. at 206-17. 
 10 Although Professor Davies understands me to be making an argument 
substantially different from the one Justice Scalia made in Crawford, see Thomas Y. 
Davies, Revisiting the Fictional Originalism in Crawford’s “Cross-Examination Rule”: A 
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Part I of this Article examines Davies’ evidence that 
Marian examinations were admissible without regard to 
whether the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine.  I 
conclude that properly taken Marian examinations were 
admissible, but that Davies’ sources show no more than that.  
Part II turns to the affirmative case for the cross-examination 
rule, focusing first on the prisoner’s right to be present.  I 
conclude that prisoners would have been routinely present 
when witnesses were deposed at Marian committal hearings, 
and argue that presence was widely viewed as a procedural 
right by the time of the framing.  Part III turns to cross-
examination as such.  I find that many believed a prisoner had 
a right to cross-examine witnesses at his committal hearing, 
but that the point was still disputed at the time of the framing.  
In Part IV, I explain why the Confrontation Clause would have 
been understood to resolve that dispute in favor of cross-
examination. 
I. ADMISSIBILITY 
Whether the Marian statutes permitted ex parte 
depositions to be read against a criminal defendant is, at 
bottom, a question of timing.  Even setting aside the 1787, 
1789, and 1791 cases whose significance Professor Davies 
disputes, admissibility clearly became conditioned, at some 
point, on whether the defendant had an opportunity to cross-
examine.  Between 1795 and 1824, for example, at least seven 
English treatises11 and four English case reports12 expressly 
  
Reply to Mr. Kry, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 557, 573-77 (2007), I believe he greatly overstates 
the extent of any difference.  See infra note 287.   
 11 See 4 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 423 
(Thomas Leach ed., London 7th ed. 1795) (“[A]n examination of a person murderously 
wounded, taken by a justice of the peace . . . in the absence of the prisoner, cannot be 
read in evidence on the subsequent trial of the prisoner for murder, for it is taken 
extrajudicially, and not as the statutes of Philip and Mary direct, in a case where the 
prisoner is brought before him in custody, and he has the opportunity of contradicting 
or cross-examining as to the facts alledged.”); THOMAS PEAKE, A COMPENDIUM OF THE 
LAW OF EVIDENCE 40-41 (London, Rider 1801) (“[I]f in a case of felony one magistrate 
takes the deposition on oath of any person in the presence of the prisoner, whether the 
party wounded, or even an accomplice; and the deponent dies before the trial, the 
depositions may be read in evidence; but if the prisoner be not present at the time of 
the examination, it cannot.”); William David Evans, On the Law of Evidence, in 2 
ROBERT JOSEPH POTHIER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS, OR CONTRACTS 
app. 16, at 141, 230 (William David Evans trans., London, Strahan 1806) (“[S]uch 
examinations, if taken in the presence of the party charged, shall be admitted as 
evidence, in case of the witness’s death in the mean time.”); S.M. PHILLIPPS, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 277 & n.3 (London, Strahan 2d ed. 1815) (1814) 
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conditioned admissibility on either an opportunity to cross-
examine or the prisoner’s presence at the examination.  
Similarly, between 1794 and 1858, at least sixteen reported 
American cases conditioned admissibility on those criteria.13   
  
(admissible if “taken in the presence of [the] prisoner”); 1 JOSEPH CHITTY, A PRACTICAL 
TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 79 (London, Valpy 1816) (examinations “must be done 
in the presence of the party accused, in order that he may have the advantage of cross-
examining the witnesses, and contradicting their testimony, or the examinations 
cannot be received in evidence”); JOHN FREDERICK ARCHBOLD, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW 
RELATIVE TO PLEADING AND EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES *85 (New York, Gould & Son 
1st Am. ed. 1824) (1822) (“Depositions, to be thus given in evidence, must have been 
taken in the presence of the prisoner, so that he might have had an opportunity of cross 
examining the witness.”); 1 THOMAS STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
EVIDENCE *96 (Boston, Wells & Lilly 1st Am. ed. 1826) (1824) (“[T]he depositions of 
witnesses before magistrates, under the statutes of Philip and Mary, are not evidence, 
unless the prisoner had an opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses . . . .”); see 
also LEONARD MACNALLY, THE RULES OF EVIDENCE ON PLEAS OF THE CROWN 296-301 
(Dublin, Fitzpatrick 1802) (semble). 
 12 See King v. Eriswell, 3 T.R. 707, 710 n.(c), 100 Eng. Rep. 815, 817 n.(c) 
(K.B. 1790) (reporter’s note 1797) (“Nor [are Marian depositions admissible] since that 
statute, unless the party accused be present . . . .”); Rex v. Forbes, Holt 599 n.*, 599 n.*, 
171 Eng. Rep. 354 n.*, 354 n.* (1814) (reported in 1818 in a note to Rex v. Wilson, Holt 
597, 171 Eng. Rep. 353 (1817)) (“The intention of the statute of Philip and Mary is 
sufficiently plain.  It is, that the prisoner shall be present whilst the witness actually 
delivers his testimony; so that he may know the precise words he uses, and observe 
throughout the manner and demeanour with which he gives his testimony.”); Rex v. 
Smith, Holt 614, 615, 171 Eng. Rep. 357, 360 (1817) (reported 1818) (“Undoubtedly, 
. . . the decisions established the point, that the prisoner ought to be present, that he 
might cross-examine.”); Rex v. Smith, 2 Stark. 208, 210-11 & n.(a), 171 Eng. Rep. 622, 
623 & n.(a) (1817) (reported 1820) (similar); see also Rex v. Smith, Russ. & Ry. 339, 340 
n.(c), 168 Eng. Rep. 834, 835 n.(c) (1817) (reported 1825) (endorsing “Mr. Starkie’s 
excellent note” on the case). 
 13 See State v. Webb, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 103, 104 (Super. L. 1794) (state felony 
committal statute “clearly implies the depositions to be read, must be taken in [the 
prisoner’s] presence,” so that he has “liberty to cross examine”); State v. Moody, 3 N.C. 
(2 Hayw.) 31, 31-32 (Super. L. 1798) (Haywood, J.) (conditioning admissibility on 
whether the deposition was “regularly taken pursuant to the act . . . ; more especially 
[i.e., more specifically] if the party to be affected by that testimony were present at the 
examination”); Johnston v. State, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 58, 59-60 (1821) (admitting 
deposition taken “under proper circumstances,” i.e., “in the presence of the prisoner”); 
State v. Hill, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 607, 608-11 (App. L. 1835) (“[I]f the accused is present 
and has an opportunity of cross examining the witness, the depositions, according to 
the rule, are admissible in evidence. . . . [N]o rule would be productive of more mischief 
than that which would allow the ex parte depositions of witnesses, and especially in 
criminal cases, to be admitted in evidence.”); Commonwealth v. Richards, 35 Mass. (18 
Pick.) 434, 437 (1836) (deposition before committing magistrate admissible because 
“the defendant did meet the witness who has deceased, face to face, and might have 
cross-examined him before the magistrate touching this accusation”); People v. Restell, 
3 Hill 289, 297 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842) (“The deposition [under the Marian statutes] must 
not only be taken in a judicial proceeding, but it must be taken when the defendant is 
present and has the opportunity to cross-examine the witness; otherwise it will not be 
received.”); Bostick v. State, 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 344, 344-45 (1842) (“It is certain that 
such a deposition, taken in the absence of the prisoner, and where he had no 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness, could not be read in evidence against 
him . . . .”); State v. Campbell, 30 S.C.L. (1 Rich.) 124, 130 (App. L. 1844) (“Neither the 
[Marian statutes nor their state equivalent] has any express provision, that the 
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Were these authorities representative of the public 
understanding of the confrontation right at the time the Sixth 
Amendment was adopted?  Or do they represent post-framing 
developments?  Professor Davies takes the latter view.14  He 
reaches that conclusion in large part because he refuses to 
consider English sources published after 1789 and American 
sources published more than a few years after the framing as 
evidence of original meaning—a limitation I consider in due 
course.15  But he also relies on pre-framing sources which, he 
contends, show that Marian examinations “were understood to 
be admissible in felony trials, without regard to whether there 
had been an opportunity for cross-examination, if a witness 
became unavailable prior to trial.”16  I evaluate that claim here. 
Davies’ evidence falls into two categories.  The first 
consists of statements in treatises and manuals, most notably 
Sir Matthew Hale’s, to the effect that a Marian examination 
was admissible if the witness was dead, too sick to travel, or 
kept away by the accused.  The second consists of the 1696 
  
depositions shall go to the jury in any case.  But the Statute P. & M. has been so 
expounded:—Provided the accused was present, and had the opportunity of a cross-
examination, and the witness be dead, &c.”); State v. Hooker, 17 Vt. 658, 669 (1845) 
(admitting magistrate’s testimony because proceedings were “adversary” (emphasis 
omitted)); Tharp v. State, 15 Ala. 749, 753 (1849) (“[D]epositions taken before the 
examining court, in the presence of, and on cross-examination by, the prisoner . . . are 
received as evidence, if the witnesses are dead.”); Davis v. State, 17 Ala. 354, 357 
(1850) (committal examination admissible if “the witness was duly sworn by competent 
authority and the accused had the opportunity of cross-examining him”); Kendrick v. 
State, 29 Tenn. (10 Hum.) 479, 487 (1850) (committal examination admissible because 
“evidence of the deceased witness was given on oath before the committing court, in the 
presence of the accused, who had the right to cross-examine”); United States v. 
Macomb, 26 F. Cas. 1132, 1134 (C.C.D. Ill. 1851) (No. 15,702) (examination admissible 
“provided the defendant was present, had the liberty to cross-examine, and the witness 
was dead”); Collier v. State, 13 Ark. 676, 678 (1853) (examination inadmissible where 
the record “fail[s] to show that the prisoner was present at the examination”); State v. 
McO’Blenis, 24 Mo. 402, 414-15 (1857) (admitting “deposition of a witness regularly 
taken in a judicial proceeding against the accused in respect to the same transaction 
and in his presence”); State v. Houser, 26 Mo. 431, 438 (1858) (deposition admissible 
only if taken “in the presence of the accused, when an opportunity for cross-
examination is afforded”); cf. Dunwiddie v. Commonwealth, 3 Ky. (Hard.) 290, 290 
(1808) (“It appears to this court to be unnecessary to enter into any reasoning to show 
the impropriety of the decision of the inferior court.  It is sufficient to say, that the 
principle decided by that court, viz. ‘That in the case of bastardy, the warrant before 
the justice ought to be received as evidence by the court, of the person charged being 
the father of the child,’ is a violation of the most fundamental rules of evidence; 
withholds from the person accused an advantage which was most unquestionably his 
right—the benefit of a cross examination; and, if admitted, it would also confine to a 
justice of the peace, the exclusive right of inquiring into the truth of the fact charged.”).   
 14 See Davies, supra note 5, at 118-19.  
 15 See id. at 155, 180. 
 16 Id. at 108. 
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Paine decision and subsequent interpretations of that case in 
treatises and manuals.  I discuss each category in turn. 
A. Hale and the Unavailability Rule 
The Marian statutes required justices of the peace to 
examine felony suspects and witnesses at committal hearings,17 
and also included similar provisions for coroners’ inquests.18  
The results were to be certified to the court, but the statutes 
said nothing about whether they were meant to take the place 
of trial testimony.19  That question fell to judicial construction 
when Lord Morly was tried for murder before the House of 
Lords in 1666 after killing his opponent in a duel.20  The judges 
convened before trial to decide how to advise the House on 
evidentiary questions expected to arise, among them the 
admissibility of certain depositions taken by the coroner.21  
They resolved that a deposition was admissible if the witness 
was dead, too sick to travel, or kept away by the accused, but 
not otherwise.22   
  
 17 See 1 & 2 Phil. & M., c. 13 (1554) (“And that the said Justices or one of 
them being of the Quorum, when any such prisoner is brought before them for any 
Manslaughter or Felony, before any Bailment or Mainprise, shall take the examination 
of the said Prisoner and information of them that brings him, of the fact and 
circumstances thereof, and the same, or as much thereof as shall be material to prove 
the felony, shall put in writing before they make the same Bailment . . . .”); 2 & 3 Phil. 
& M., c. 10 (1555) (“That from henceforth such Justices or Justice before whom any 
person shall be brought for Manslaughter or Felony, or for suspicion thereof, before he 
or they shall commit or send such Prisoner to Ward, shall take the examination of such 
Prisoner, and information of those that bring him, of the fact and circumstance thereof, 
and the same or as much thereof as shall be material to prove the Felony shall put in 
writing, within two days after the said examination . . . .”).  I have altered the spelling 
in all quotations from Statutes of the Realm. 
 18 See 1 & 2 Phil. & M., c. 13 (1554) (“And that every Coroner, upon any 
Inquisition before him found, whereby any person or persons shall be indicted for 
murder or manslaughter, or as accessory or accessories to the same before the murder 
or manslaughter committed, shall put in writing the effect of the evidence given to the 
Jury before him being material . . . .”). 
 19 The statutes’ intent in that regard has long been debated.  See, e.g., Rex v. 
Smith, 2 Stark. 208, 211 n.(a), 171 Eng. Rep. 622, 623 n.(a) (1817) (reporter’s note 
1820) (observing that the statutes “seem to have been passed without any direct 
intention on the part of the legislature, to use the examinations and depositions as 
evidence upon the trials of felons”); JOHN H. LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME IN THE 
RENAISSANCE 24-34 (1974) (contending that “the Marian draftsman did not intend to 
institute a system of written evidence”). 
 20 Lord Morly’s Case, Kel. 53, 84 Eng. Rep. 1079 (1666) (also reported as Lord 
Morley’s Case, 6 How. St. Tr. 769 (H.L. 1666)). 
 21 See id. at 53-55, 84 Eng. Rep. at 1079-80.  
 22 See id. at 55, 84 Eng. Rep. at 1080 (“[I]n case any of the witnesses which 
were examined before the coroner, were dead or unable to travel, and oath made 
thereof, . . . the examinations of such witnesses, so dead or unable to travel might be 
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Lord Morly’s case involved coroners’ depositions, but 
that “unavailability rule” was extended to committal 
examinations as well.  Sir Matthew Hale, one of the judges who 
had presided at Lord Morly’s case, wrote in his History of the 
Pleas of the Crown that “examinations and informations thus 
taken and returned may be read in evidence against the 
prisoner, if the informer be dead, or so sick, that he is not able 
to travel, and oath thereof made; otherwise not.”23  As Davies 
notes, similar statements appear in treatises by William 
Hawkins and Francis Buller, and in colonial manuals for 
justices of the peace.24   
Professor Davies relies on those statements to argue 
that Marian depositions “were understood to be admissible in 
felony trials, without regard to whether there had been an 
opportunity for cross-examination, if a witness became 
unavailable prior to trial.”25  He concludes that absence of 
opportunity to cross-examine had no effect on the admissibility 
of depositions of unavailable witnesses in founding-era 
criminal trials.26  Those conclusions, however, do not follow.  
Rather, they rest on implicit assumptions about Marian 
procedure. 
If the right to confrontation prohibited ex parte 
depositions at trial, there are two ways in which Marian 
procedure could be consistent with that right.  First, a trial 
court could condition the admissibility of a Marian examination 
on whether the accused had an opportunity to cross-examine at 
the committal hearing.  In that case, even if Marian 
examinations were often taken ex parte, they would not 
contravene the cross-examination rule, because ex parte 
examinations would be excluded at trial.  Second, an 
opportunity for cross-examination could be a natural or routine 
feature of a committal hearing.  In that case, it would not 
matter whether a trial court conditioned admissibility on 
opportunity to cross-examine.  That opportunity would be a 
  
read, the coroner first making oath that such examinations are the same which he took 
upon oath, without any addition or alteration whatsoever.”); see also Bromwich’s Case, 
1 Lev. 180, 180, 83 Eng. Rep. 358, 358 (K.B. 1666) (“[T]he depositions of two other 
witnesses taken before the coroner, which were now dead, were read to the same effect, 
as they were read before the lords on the trial of the Lord Morly, by the opinion of all 
the Judges of England.”).  
 23 2 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 284 (Sollom 
Emlyn ed., London, Nutt & Gosling 1736).   
 24 See Davies, supra note 5, at 146-52, 182-86. 
 25 Id. at 108. 
 26 Id. 
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consequence of the way an examination was normally 
conducted. 
Professor Davies acknowledges the distinction between 
those two forms of consistency late in his article.27  But he 
largely ignores its significance for the unavailability rule.  That 
rule addressed the conditions under which a Marian 
examination was admissible, not the manner in which an 
examination was normally conducted.  That a Marian 
examination was admissible if the witness was unavailable 
does not show that ex parte examinations would routinely be 
admitted.  It would show that only if Marian examinations 
were routinely conducted ex parte.  
Nor does the unavailability rule necessarily show that 
opportunity to cross-examine was not a condition of 
admissibility.  The rule says nothing about cross-examination 
one way or the other; Davies must rely on a negative inference 
drawn from that omission.  The strength of that inference, 
however, depends entirely on how Marian examinations were 
normally conducted.  If they were often taken ex parte, the 
negative-inference argument has some force.  If they were not, 
the argument is much weaker; opportunity to cross-examine 
could then simply be implicit in the fact that a deposition was 
properly taken under the Marian statutes.28 
  
 27 The distinction is reflected in his “strong” and “nuanced” interpretations of 
Crawford ’s description of the 1787, 1789, and 1791 decisions.  See id. at 162-78. 
 28 Although many treatises and manuals state the unavailability rule in 
terms similar to Hale’s, some arguably provide more support for Professor Davies’ 
position.  For example, Buller’s treatise states: 
It is a general Rule, that Depositions taken in a Court not of Record shall not 
be allowed in Evidence elsewhere.  So it has been holden in Regard to 
Depositions in the ecclesiastical Court, though the Witnesses were dead.  So 
where there cannot be a Cross-Examination, as Depositions taken before 
Commissioners of Bankrupts, they shall not be read in Evidence; yet if the 
Witnesses examined on a Coroner’s Inquest be dead, or beyond Sea, their 
Depositions may be read; for the Coroner is an Officer appointed on Behalf of 
the Public, to make Enquiry about the Matters within his Jurisdiction; and 
therefore the Law will presume the Depositions before him to be fairly and 
impartially taken.—And by [the Marian statutes] Justices of the Peace shall 
examine of Persons brought before them for Felony, and of those who brought 
them, and certify such Examination to the next Gaol-Delivery; but the 
Examination of the Prisoner shall be without Oath, and the others upon 
Oath, and these Examinations shall be read against the Offender upon an 
Indictment, if the Witnesses be dead. 
FRANCIS BULLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW RELATIVE TO TRIALS AT NISI PRIUS 
342 (Dublin 1768).  Burn’s manual includes a similar passage, although it combines the 
references to coroners’ depositions and committal examinations while omitting the 
rationale for admissibility of coroners’ depositions.  See 1 RICHARD BURN, THE JUSTICE 
OF THE PEACE, AND PARISH OFFICER 336 (London, Woodfall & Strahan 1764).  Davies 
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Authorities before and after the framing confirm that 
Hale and other proponents of the unavailability rule were 
widely understood not to have suggested that an unavailable 
witness’s Marian deposition was admissible regardless of the 
circumstances under which it was taken.  An early example 
comes from the 1696 debates over Sir John Fenwick’s bill of 
attainder for treason in the House of Commons.29  The 
prosecution sought to admit the examination of an unavailable 
witness taken in Fenwick’s absence.  Fenwick’s counsel 
opposed admission because Fenwick was not “present or privy” 
and thus had “no opportunity . . . to cross-examine the 
person.”30  Counsel contended that such examinations were 
“never admitted” in “criminal cases” and that “it was never 
attempted in any court of justice, that the examination of 
witnesses behind a man’s back, could be read in any place 
whatsoever.”31 
Debate ensued among Members of Parliament.  One 
disputed counsel’s broad claim that ex parte examinations were 
inadmissible in criminal cases by invoking Hale’s discussion of 
the Marian statutes:  “No less a man than my L. C. Justice 
Hales . . . in his Pleas of the Crown . . . says; First, by the 
[Marian statutes], the justice hath power to examine the 
offender and informer; and . . . these examinations, if the party 
  
argues that the contrast these sources draw to bankruptcy depositions, which were 
inadmissible due to inability to cross-examine, implies that cross-examination was not 
a condition of admissibility for committal examinations.  See Davies, supra note 5, at 
151; Davies, supra note 10, at 591-93.  But these sources offer Davies only ambiguous 
support.  First, it is not clear that the words “yet” and “but” draw a comparison based 
on admissibility despite inability to cross-examine rather than admissibility 
generally—one could certainly say, for example, that “bankruptcy depositions are 
inadmissible because cross-examination is impossible ‘yet’ (or ‘but’) Marian 
examinations are admissible precisely because cross-examination is possible.”  (Buller’s 
inclusion of a rationale for admissibility of coroners’ depositions makes it unlikely he 
intended that meaning, but Burn’s manual is more ambiguous.)  Second, it is not clear 
that the “yet” in Buller’s passage applies to the entire remainder of the paragraph, 
rather than just the remainder of the sentence addressing coroners’ depositions.  The 
final sentence addressing committal examinations could merely be a resumption of the 
paragraph’s survey of the admissibility of various types of depositions. 
 29 13 How. St. Tr. 537 (H.C. 1696).  Fenwick was charged with treason, not 
felony, so the Marian statutes did not apply.  Nevertheless, the debates are relevant. 
 30 Id. at 591 (Powys); see also id. at 592 (“[I]f that should be allowed for 
evidence, then what is sworn behind a man’s back, in any case whatsoever, may as well 
be produced as evidence against him . . . .”). 
 31 Id. at 592 (Shower); see also id. (“[N]o deposition of a person can be read, 
though beyond sea, unless in cases where the party it is to be read against was privy to 
the examination, and might have cross-examined him, or examined to his credit, if he 
thought fit; it was never pretended, depositions could be read upon other 
circumstances.”). 
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be dead or absent, may be given in evidence.”32  Another 
Member responded, however, that Hale’s rule applied only 
when the examination was taken in the prisoner’s presence 
(and then only in felony cases):  “I don’t think [counsel] were 
ignorant of the case quoted out of my L. C. J. Hales, but they 
thought it was not applicable to this business before the House; 
but only related to felonies, and when depositions were taken in 
the presence of the party.”33   
Davies relegates Fenwick’s case to a footnote because he 
“know[s] of no evidence [the Framers] were conversant with” 
it.34  But the case was plainly available to them; Crawford cites 
Howell’s 1812 report, but the same report appears in earlier 
editions of the State Trials as far back as 1719.35  Several 
colonial libraries had copies of the State Trials,36 and scholars 
have assumed the Framers were familiar with their contents.37  
Fenwick’s case in particular is discussed and cited to the State 
Trials by both Blackstone and Hawkins.38  The case shows that, 
even as early as 1696, there was disagreement over whether 
Hale’s rule implied that the Marian deposition of an 
unavailable witness was admissible regardless of the 
circumstances under which it was taken. 
A 1794 North Carolina decision, State v. Webb, is also 
instructive.39  There, the Attorney General invoked the state’s 
equivalent of the Marian statutes in seeking to admit an 
unavailable witness’s deposition taken ex parte.  He cited the 
passages from Hale, Hawkins, and Buller on which Davies 
  
 32 Id. at 596 (Sloane).  Hale’s History of the Pleas of the Crown was not 
published until 1736; Sloane is referring to Hale’s earlier Summary.  See Davies, supra 
note 5, at 129-30 & n.80. 
 33 Id. at 602 (Musgrave) (emphasis added). 
 34 Davies, supra note 5, at 121-22 n.50. 
 35 See 4 A COMPLEAT COLLECTION OF STATE-TRYALS, AND PROCEEDINGS UPON 
IMPEACHMENTS FOR HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANOURS 232, 
256-63 (Thomas Salmon ed., London 1719). 
 36 See RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 87 
n.160 (1973).  
 37 See, e.g., id. (“[I]t is not to be presumed that [the Framers] were ignorant of 
the famous State Trials.”). 
 38 See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
351 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1769); 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF 
THE CROWN 428 & n.(a), 430 (London, Nutt & Gosling 1721). 
 39 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 103 (Super. L. 1794). 
2007] CONFRONTATION UNDER THE MARIAN STATUTES 503 
relies.40  But the court rejected his interpretation of those 
authorities: 
These authorities do not say that depositions taken in the absence of 
the prisoner shall be read, and our [committal statute] clearly 
implies the depositions to be read, must be taken in his presence: it 
is a rule of the common law, founded on natural justice, that no man 
shall be prejudiced by evidence which he had not the liberty to cross 
examine; and though it be insisted that the act intended to make an 
exception in this instance, to the rule of the common law, yet the act 
has not expressly said so, and we will not by implication derogate 
from the salutary rule established by the common law.41 
Webb thus expressly conditioned admissibility on an 
opportunity for cross-examination; and it viewed that 
condition, not as departing from the unavailability rule, but as 
consistent with that rule.42 
Subsequent cases and treatises that conditioned 
admissibility on presence or opportunity for cross-examination 
uniformly interpreted the earlier sources in that fashion—as 
stating that unavailability was a condition of admissibility but 
not implying that the deposition of an unavailable witness was 
admissible regardless of the manner in which it was taken.  An 
1818 case report, for example, cited Hale and Hawkins for the 
  
 40 Id. at 103-04 (“and cited in support of this attempt, 2 H.H.P.C. 284 [Hale’s 
History of the Pleas of the Crown].  H.P.C. 429 [Hawkins’s Pleas of the Crown].  Bull. 
252 [Buller’s Nisi Prius].  La. Evid. 140, 142.  3 Term Rep. 713 [Eriswell].”). 
 41 Id. at 104. 
 42 Despite having previously acknowledged that Webb supports Crawford ’s 
cross-examination rule, see Davies, supra note 5, at 181-82, Davies now claims the case 
is inapposite because the witness was not “genuinely unavailable,” see Davies, supra 
note 10, at 627-28.  His new interpretation, however, is implausible.  Although the 
report never expressly states that the witness was unavailable, the case was obviously 
argued and decided on that premise.  The Attorney General clearly thought the witness 
was unavailable because the authorities he relied on expressly conditioned 
admissibility on unavailability.  See supra note 40.  His argument makes no sense if 
the witness was available.  And the court’s holding had nothing to do with availability; 
rather, the court held that the state’s equivalent of the Marian statutes “clearly 
implie[d]” that witnesses must be examined “in [the prisoner’s] presence” at the 
committal hearing (so that the prisoner had “liberty to cross examine”), and for that 
reason, “[t]hese authorities” on which the Attorney General relied—which, again, relate 
only to unavailable witnesses—“do not say that depositions taken in the absence of the 
prisoner shall be read.”  Webb, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) at 104.  Furthermore, the court’s 
rationale—that the committal statute itself “clearly implie[d]” a right to be present at 
the committal hearing—necessarily applied to witnesses who later became unavailable 
to testify at trial, since there is typically no way to predict which witnesses will become 
unavailable at the time the prisoner exercises his right to be present at the committal 
hearing.  In short, Davies dismisses Webb only by attributing a nonsensical argument 
to the prosecutor and ignoring the court’s express holding in favor of a rationale the 
court said nothing about.  I am certainly willing to admit that some of the sources I 
rely on are ambiguous, but this is not one of them.  
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point that “it seems now to be settled” that a Marian deposition 
was admissible if “the informant is dead, or not able to travel, 
or . . . kept away by the means and contrivance of the prisoner,” 
but also stated that it was “plain” under the Marian statutes 
that “the prisoner shall be present whilst the witness actually 
delivers his testimony.”43  An 1814 treatise cited Hale, 
Hawkins, and Buller for the point that a Marian deposition 
was admissible if the witness was unavailable, but said the 
rule applied only to an examination taken “in the presence of 
[the] prisoner.”44  An 1816 treatise cited Hale, Hawkins, and 
Buller for the unavailability rule, but also stated that 
examinations “must be done in the presence of the party 
accused, in order that he may have the advantage of cross-
examining the witnesses.”45  And an 1822 treatise cited Hale’s 
unavailability rule but stated that “[d]epositions, to be thus 
given in evidence, must have been taken in the presence of the 
prisoner, so that he might have had an opportunity of cross 
examining the witness.”46  
The unavailability rule stated in Lord Morly’s case was 
construed the same way.  An 1808 treatise, commenting on an 
earlier claim that Lord Morly’s case proved the admissibility of 
ex parte coroners’ depositions, stated: “Mr. J. Buller is reported 
to have said that it was so settled in [Lord Morly’s case and a 
companion case]; certainly nothing of the kind appears in those 
books.”47  And an 1844 decision characterized Lord Morly’s case 
as “quite uncertain, as to the precise point of the absence of the 
accused at the taking of the depositions,” and stated that it 
could not “conceive how judges could have resolved, that the 
depositions of deceased witnesses, when examined by the 
coroner, should be received as competent evidence . . . but by 
assuming that the written testimony had been taken under all 
the guards and tests of the common law, and especially those of 
the cross-examination.”48 
  
 43 Rex v. Forbes, Holt 599 n.*, 599-600 n.*, 171 Eng. Rep. 354 n.*, 354-55 n.* 
(1814) (reported 1818). 
 44 PHILLIPPS, supra note 11, at 277 & nn.1-7. 
 45 1 CHITTY, supra note 11, at 79-81 & nn.(w)-(y). 
 46 ARCHBOLD, supra note 11, at *85. 
 47 THOMAS PEAKE, A COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 64 n.(m) 
(London, Hanfard & Sons 3d ed. 1808); see also 2 STARKIE, supra note 11, at *490 
(similar).  Peake was commenting on Buller’s opinion in Eriswell, as to which see infra 
notes 128-44 and accompanying text. 
 48 State v. Campbell, 30 S.C.L. (1 Rich.) 124, 127, 131-32 (App. L. 1844). 
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Of course, these post-framing interpretations were not 
available to the Framers in 1789 or 1791.  But that does not 
make them irrelevant.  The way that Hale, Hawkins, and 
Buller were understood in 1794 or even 1822 is some evidence 
of how they were understood at the time of the framing—not 
conclusive evidence, but better evidence (temporally speaking) 
than the way Professor Davies (or even Justice Scalia) might 
interpret them today.  Those later sources show that the 
unavailability rule was widely understood not to imply that the 
Marian deposition of an unavailable witness was admissible 
regardless of the circumstances under which it was taken.   
B. Paine and the Felony/Misdemeanor Distinction 
Professor Davies’ other line of authority consists of the 
1696 decision in King v. Paine49 and later commentaries on that 
case by Hawkins, Geoffrey Gilbert, and American manuals 
quoting Hawkins.  Paine was charged with criminal libel, a 
misdemeanor.  He was represented by Sir Bartholomew 
Shower, who (perhaps not coincidentally) was also defense 
counsel in Fenwick’s case.50  The Crown sought to admit the ex 
parte examination of a dead witness who had implicated Paine.  
The court rejected the evidence, but the rationale for its 
decision differs across the five reports of the case. 
In the Modern Reports, defense counsel argued that the 
examination was inadmissible because “the defendant had lost 
all opportunity of cross-examining” and “this case was not like 
an information before a coroner, or an examination by justices 
of peace of persons accused, and afterwards committed for 
felony, because they have power by a particular statute to take 
such examinations both of the fact and circumstances, and to 
put it in writing and certify it at the next general gaol 
  
 49 There are five reports of the evidentiary decision in the case:  King v. 
Paine, 5 Mod. 163, 87 Eng. Rep. 584 (K.B. 1696); Rex v. Pain, Comb. 358, 90 Eng. Rep. 
527 (K.B. 1697); Rex v. Pain, Holt 294, 90 Eng. Rep. 1062 (K.B. 1697); Rex v. Paine, 1 
Salk. 281, 91 Eng. Rep. 246 (K.B. 1696); and Rex v. Payne, Ld. Raym. 729, 91 Eng. 
Rep. 1387 (K.B. n.d.).  Paine is customarily dated to January 1696 (i.e., Hilary Term, 
7 Will. 3), as reported by Modern and Salkeld, see, e.g., 3 JOHN H. WIGMORE, A 
TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 
§ 1364, at 22 & n.53 (2d ed. 1923), but there is reason to believe that Comberbach and 
Holt’s date of 1697 is the correct one.  If Paine had been decided in January 1696, it 
surely would have been mentioned in the debates in Fenwick’s case later that year, 
especially since the same lawyer represented both defendants.  See infra note 50 and 
accompanying text; cf. 3 WIGMORE, supra, § 1364, at 22 n.53.   
 50 Compare Pain, Comb. at 359, 90 Eng. Rep. at 527, with Fenwick’s Case, 13 
How. St. Tr. 537, 592-93 (H.C. 1696).  
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delivery.”51  The prosecutor responded that “the statute makes 
no difference in this case, for the power of a justice of peace to 
take examinations is not grounded upon it; for he might 
examine a criminal by virtue of his office.”52  The court held 
simply that “these depositions should not be given in evidence, 
the defendant not being present when they were taken before 
the mayor, and so had lost the benefit of a cross-examination.”53 
According to the Comberbach and Holt reports, the 
examination was inadmissible “for two reasons”:  “1. It appears, 
that the defendant was not present when the examination was 
taken, so that he could not cross-examine him.  2. There is a 
difference between capital offences and cases of misdemeanour, 
for in case of felony the justices are by the [Marian statutes] to 
take the examinations in writing, and certify them to the gaol-
delivery, &c. and if the party be dead or absent, they may be 
given in evidence.”54  Finally, the Salkeld and Lord Raymond 
reports rely on the Marian statutory limitation to felonies 
without mentioning cross-examination.55  
Read together, the five reports suggest that two 
factors—the absence of opportunity to cross-examine and the 
Marian statutory limitation to felonies—were both relevant to 
the outcome.  But the reports leave unclear how those two 
strands of analysis relate to each other.  One reading—
Professor Davies’—is that they were interrelated grounds for 
decision:  The examination was inadmissible because it was 
taken outside the authority of the Marian statutes, and non-
Marian examinations were admissible (if at all) only upon a 
prior opportunity for cross-examination.56  On that reading, 
Paine’s distinction between felonies and misdemeanors 
arguably does support the claim that Marian examinations 
were admissible without regard to opportunity for cross-
examination. 
  
 51 5 Mod. at 164, 87 Eng. Rep. at 585. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 165, 87 Eng. Rep. at 585. 
 54 Comb. at 359, 90 Eng. Rep. at 527; Holt at 294, 90 Eng. Rep. at 1062. 
 55 1 Salk. at 281, 91 Eng. Rep. at 246 (“[I]n cases of felony such depositions 
before a justice, if the deponent die, may be used in evidence by the [Marian statutes].  
But this cannot be extended farther than the particular case of feleny [sic], and 
therefore not to this case.”); Ld. Raym. at 730, 91 Eng. Rep. at 1387 (“[I]n indictments 
for felony, by [the Marian statutes] such informations may be read, the deponent being 
dead.  But in indictments or informations for misdemeanors, or in civil actions, or 
appeals of murder, no such information can be given in evidence . . . .”).  
 56 See Davies, supra note 5, at 140-43. 
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Another interpretation, however, is that the two 
grounds for decision were independent:  The examination was 
excluded both because there was no opportunity for cross-
examination and because there was no statutory authority to 
take examinations in misdemeanor cases, either ground alone 
being sufficient to exclude.  In other words, misdemeanor 
examinations were never admissible, regardless of how they 
were taken; felony examinations were admissible, but only if 
there was an opportunity for cross-examination.  The 
“difference” between felony and misdemeanor examinations 
was not that felony examinations were admissible even if ex 
parte, but simply that they were admissible at all.   
Comberbach and Holt do speak of “two reasons” why the 
examination was excluded, suggesting those reasons were 
alternative grounds for decision.57  And every report that 
addresses the felony/misdemeanor distinction does so in 
connection with the authority-to-examine issue, not the cross-
examination issue.58  Davies himself interprets Paine to hold 
that examinations were never admissible in misdemeanor 
cases.59  But he thereby undermines his other argument that 
  
 57 Comb. at 359, 90 Eng. Rep. at 527; Holt at 294, 90 Eng. Rep. at 1062. 
 58 Comberbach and Holt address the “difference” between Marian and 
misdemeanor examinations in their discussions of authority to examine, not their 
separate references to opportunity to cross-examine.  Comb. at 359, 90 Eng. Rep. at 
527; Holt at 294, 90 Eng. Rep. at 1062.  Salkeld and Lord Raymond (who stake the 
decision solely on authority grounds) report the court’s distinction between Marian and 
misdemeanor examinations; Modern (which stakes the decision solely on cross-
examination) does not.  Compare 1 Salk. at 281, 91 Eng. Rep. at 246, and Ld. Raym. at 
730, 91 Eng. Rep. at 1387, with 5 Mod. at 165, 87 Eng. Rep. at 585.  The only passage 
in any report that even arguably connects the Marian/misdemeanor difference to the 
cross-examination rule is defense counsel’s argument in Modern.  See 5 Mod. at 164, 87 
Eng. Rep. at 585 (examination inadmissible because “the defendant had lost all 
opportunity of cross-examining him; that this case was not like an information before a 
coroner, or an examination by justices of peace of persons accused, and afterwards 
committed for felony, because they have power by a particular statute to take such 
examinations both of the fact and circumstances, and to put it in writing and certify it 
at the next general gaol delivery”).  Even that passage is ambiguous, however, and 
since Paine’s counsel was the same lawyer who argued in Fenwick’s case that ex parte 
examinations were “never admitted” in “criminal cases” and that it was “never 
attempted in any court of justice, that the examination of witnesses behind a man’s 
back, could be read in any place whatsoever,” 13 How. St. Tr. 537, 592 (H.C. 1696), it 
seems unlikely he meant to concede the admissibility of ex parte Marian examinations 
in Paine.  More probably, he was arguing that the examination was inadmissible both 
because “the defendant had lost all opportunity of cross-examining” and because “this 
case was not like an information before a coroner, or an examination by justices of 
peace of persons accused, and afterwards committed for felony.”  5 Mod. at 164, 87 Eng. 
Rep. at 585. 
 59 Davies, supra note 5, at 137-40.  Davies attributes the contrary view to 
Justice Scalia, id. at 137, apparently because Crawford states that “admissibility . . . 
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Paine shows Marian examinations were admissible even absent 
opportunity to cross-examine:  If misdemeanor examinations 
were never admissible, they were “differen[t]” from felony 
examinations, whether or not the cross-examination rule 
applied to the latter.  Furthermore, if misdemeanor 
examinations were never admissible and felony examinations 
were always admissible, it is hard to see why Paine bothered to 
say anything about cross-examination at all.   
Several English authorities read Paine in precisely the 
fashion suggested here.  An 1814 treatise, for example, cited 
the Modern version of Paine for the point that a Marian 
examination had to be taken “in the presence of [the] 
prisoner.”60  It then cited the Lord Raymond version for the 
point that an examination “cannot be given in evidence on an 
indictment for a misdemeanor” at all.61  Similarly, an 1816 
treatise cited Modern for the point that Marian examinations 
“must be done in the presence of the party accused, in order 
that he may have the advantage of cross-examining the 
witnesses,”62 while citing Modern, Salkeld, Comberbach, and 
Lord Raymond for the point that “the depositions cannot, in 
any case, be given in evidence on an indictment for a 
misdemeanour.”63 
  
depended on whether the defendant had had an opportunity to cross-examine.”  
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 45 (2004).   
 60 PHILLIPPS, supra note 11, at 277 & n.3. 
 61 Id. at 278 & n.2. 
 62 1 CHITTY, supra note 11, at 79 & n.(l). 
 63 Id. at 81 & n.(a); see also Cox v. Coleridge, 1 B. & C. 37, 48 & n.(a), 107 
Eng. Rep. 15, 19 & n.(a) (K.B. 1822) (reporter’s note to counsel’s argument) (citing 
Salkeld and Modern for the point that a Marian deposition may “be read in evidence 
against the prisoner, on the ground that he has had the opportunity for [a] cross-
examination”); ARCHBOLD, supra note 11, at *85 (citing Modern, Salkeld, and Lord 
Raymond for the point that a Marian examination, “to be thus given in evidence, must 
have been taken in the presence of the prisoner, so that he might have had an 
opportunity of cross examining the witness,” while citing Salkeld for the point that an 
examination cannot “be read in the case of misdemeanors, at all; the statute extending 
only to manslaughter and felony”).  Other English authorities read Paine as holding 
that misdemeanor examinations were never admissible, and also stated that ex parte 
felony examinations were inadmissible, without attributing that latter point to Paine.  
An 1820 reporter’s note cited Paine for the point that “examinations and depositions 
taken in a case of misdemeanour, cannot be read in evidence, because the statutes 
apply to cases of felony only.”  Rex v. Smith, 2 Stark. 208, 211 n.(a), 171 Eng. Rep. 622, 
623-24 n.(a) (1817).  But even Marian examinations, the author added, became 
admissible only “upon the rules and principles of evidence already established,” and 
admissibility at common law depended on “an opportunity to cross-examine.”  Id.  
Likewise, an 1801 treatise cited Paine for the point that examinations were never 
admissible in misdemeanor cases, but stated in the preceding sentence that a felony 
examination was inadmissible “if the prisoner be not present at the time of the 
examination.”  PEAKE (1801), supra note 11, at 41. 
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American authorities read Paine the same way.  An 
1835 South Carolina case relied on it to conclude that the 
Marian statutes did not permit admission of ex parte 
depositions:  “The case of the King v. Paine is authority at least 
for the general position that the ex parte examination of a 
witness, although taken in the course of a judicial proceeding, 
is not admissible in evidence, although the witness be dead, 
and I have before remarked that the [Marian committal] 
statute does not prescribe any new rule of evidence.”64  The 
same court cited Paine in 1844 for the point that the Marian 
statutes authorized admission “[p]rovided the accused was 
present, and had the opportunity of a cross-examination, and 
the witness be dead.”65 
An 1842 New York case is especially instructive.66  The 
witness there had been examined first by the committing 
magistrate and then pursuant to a court order.67  The court 
held the second examination inadmissible for lack of authority, 
citing the Salkeld, Lord Raymond, and Comberbach reports of 
Paine for the point that “there is no authority at the common 
law [i.e., absent statute] for taking depositions out of court in 
criminal cases.”68  The court then held the first examination 
inadmissible because, even though the magistrate had 
authority to examine under the state’s equivalent of the 
Marian statutes, the witness had not been sworn for the cross-
examination.69  The court said:  “It is settled upon the 
construction of the statutes of Phil. & Mary, that the defendant 
must be present at the examination of the witnesses against 
him . . . . [T]he defendant shall have the opportunity to cross-
examine, and if that right is not enjoyed, the deposition cannot 
be read in evidence against him on the trial”—and as to that 
point, the court cited the Modern and Comberbach versions of 
Paine.70   
Davies’ contrary authorities are not all supportive of his 
position.  For example, Hawkins (and the American manuals 
that quoted him) wrote only that “it is said to have been 
adjudged . . . , upon an Indictment for a Libel, that Depositions 
  
 64 State v. Hill, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 607, 610 (App. L. 1835) (citation omitted). 
 65 State v. Campbell, 30 S.C.L. (1 Rich.) 124, 130 (App. L. 1844). 
 66 People v. Restell, 3 Hill 289 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842). 
 67 Id. at 291-94. 
 68 Id. at 298. 
 69 Id. at 303-04. 
 70 Id. at 300. 
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taken before a Justice of Peace relating to the Fact could not be 
given in Evidence, tho’ the Deponent were dead; and that the 
Reason why such Depositions may be given in Evidence in 
Felony depends upon the [Marian statutes].  And that this 
cannot be extended farther than the particular Case of 
Felony.”71  This entails the same ambiguity as Paine itself.  Is 
the rule that “cannot be extended farther than the particular 
Case of Felony” that examinations are admissible even if taken 
ex parte, or merely that properly taken examinations are 
admissible at all?72  Notably, when Thomas Leach revised 
Hawkins’s treatise in 1795 to state that the Marian statutes 
required an “opportunity of contradicting or cross-examining,”73 
he made no change to this discussion of Paine.74  Davies relies 
on that fact as if it somehow supported his position,75 but it 
proves the opposite:  Leach evidently thought Hawkins’s 
discussion was consistent with applying the cross-examination 
rule to the Marian statutes.   
Some English sources arguably support Davies’ 
interpretation.  Gilbert, for example, wrote that Paine “would 
not allow the Examinations . . . to be given in Evidence, 
because Paine was not present to cross-examine, and tho’ tis 
Evidence in Indictments for Felony in such case by Force [of 
the Marian statutes] yet ’tis not so in Informations for 
Misdemeanors”76—a description that, while ambiguous,77 is 
  
 71 2 HAWKINS (1721), supra note 38, at 430.  For the American manuals, see 
Davies, supra note 5, at 183 n.246, 184 n.250, 184 n.253, and accompanying text. 
 72 Hawkins adds:  “But in the Report of this Case in 5 Mod. it is said that the 
Reason why such Depositions could not be read was, because the Defendant was not 
present, when they were taken, and therefore had not the Benefit of a Cross 
Examination.”  2 HAWKINS (1721), supra note 38, at 430 (footnote omitted).  This 
sentence could merely be making the point that, although some reports of Paine held 
misdemeanor examinations never admissible, Modern relied only on the absence of 
cross-examination and thus left open the possibility that a misdemeanor examination 
might be admissible if an opportunity for cross-examination were provided.   
 73 4 HAWKINS (1795), supra note 11, at 423. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Davies, supra note 5, at 149. 
 76 GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 100 (Dublin 1754).  The 
passage was written before Gilbert’s death in 1726, three generations before the 
framing; “it is generally agreed that Gilbert’s work reflects an understanding of 
evidence formed no later than the opening decade of the eighteenth century.”  Stephan 
Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary Procedure in Eighteenth 
Century England, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 497, 592 (1990).  Nevertheless, the passage was 
not substantively revised even as late as Lofft’s 1791 edition.  See 1 GEOFFREY 
GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 215 (Capel Lofft ed., London, Strahan & Woodfall 
1791).   
 77 The passage could be saying either that (1) the examination was 
inadmissible for two independent reasons: Paine was not present to cross-examine 
 
2007] CONFRONTATION UNDER THE MARIAN STATUTES 511 
perhaps more naturally read as Davies suggests.  Two 
eighteenth-century English cases also seem to interpret Paine 
in that fashion.78 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that Paine was widely 
interpreted as not only consistent with a Marian cross-
examination requirement, but as affirmatively supporting such 
a requirement.  Indeed, so far as I can tell, reported American 
cases uniformly interpreted Paine that way.  That those 
sources were post-framing does not make them irrelevant.  
Paine itself was available to the Framers, the decision is 
ambiguous on its face, and the fact that it was widely 
interpreted over the ensuing decades as establishing a cross-
examination rule applicable even to Marian examinations is 
relevant evidence of how the case was understood in 1789 or 
1791.  An interpretation cannot be dismissed as “fictional” 
when that same interpretation was ultimately adopted as 
settled law. 
C. Conclusion 
Neither Hale’s rule that a Marian examination was 
admissible if the witness was unavailable nor the decision in 
King v. Paine shows that Marian examinations were 
admissible even absent an opportunity to cross-examine.  
Rather, Hale and his successors were widely read as simply not 
addressing that issue, and Paine was widely read as taking the 
exact opposite view. 
II. PRESENCE 
I now turn to the affirmative case in support of the 
cross-examination rule.  There are two ways in which a 
  
“and” the force of the Marian statutes authorizes admission of depositions at all only in 
felony cases; or (2) the examination was inadmissible because Paine was not present to 
cross-examine, and the force of the Marian statutes authorizes admission of ex parte 
depositions only in felony cases.  In other words, the “tis” could mean either ex parte 
examinations or examinations generally, and “such case” could mean either ex parte 
examinations or unavailable witnesses generally. 
 78 See King v. Westbeer, 1 Leach 12, 12, 168 Eng. Rep. 108, 109 (1739) (citing 
Salkeld as authority for admitting a Marian deposition over the objection that it would 
deprive the prisoner of “the benefit which might otherwise have arisen from a cross-
examination”), discussed infra text accompanying notes 158-62; King v. Eriswell, 3 T.R. 
707, 722-23, 100 Eng. Rep. 815, 823-24 (K.B. 1790) (Kenyon, C.J.), quoted and 
discussed infra text accompanying notes 128-44.  But see 2 STARKIE, supra note 11, at 
*488 n.(c), *491-92 (reading Kenyon’s citation to Paine in Eriswell as adopting the 
interpretation suggested here), quoted infra note 136.  
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prisoner could be denied the opportunity to cross-examine at a 
committal hearing.  First, the magistrate could depose 
witnesses in the prisoner’s absence—a prisoner who was not 
present necessarily would have no opportunity to cross-
examine.  Second, the magistrate could depose witnesses in the 
prisoner’s presence but refuse to permit any questions.  This 
section considers the former possibility.  I first argue that, as a 
factual matter, eighteenth-century Marian examinations were 
routinely conducted in the prisoner’s presence.  I then argue 
that, by the framing, there was an emerging consensus that 
presence was also a procedural right, so that depositions taken 
in the prisoner’s absence could not be read against him at trial 
under the authority of the Marian statutes. 
A. Presence as a Routine Feature of Marian Procedure 
The Marian committal statute provided that a justice of 
the peace “before whom any person shall be brought” must 
“before . . . commit[ting] or send[ing] such Prisoner to Ward . . . 
take the examination of such Prisoner, and information of 
those that bring him.”79  The statute therefore contemplated 
depositions in very particular circumstances.  Witnesses who 
believed someone had committed a felony would “br[ing]” him 
before a justice of the peace.  When the witnesses and prisoner 
appeared before the justice, the prisoner would be in the 
witnesses’ custody, and thus their presence.  The statute 
directed the justice to examine the prisoner and witnesses 
“before” committing the prisoner to jail; there is no suggestion 
that the prisoner be sequestered while witnesses are deposed.  
A reasonable inference is that the prisoner would typically 
remain in the custody (and therefore presence) of the witnesses 
who brought him. 
That inference follows not only from the statutory text, 
but from the simple fact that Marian examinations are 
committal examinations.  The function of a committal hearing 
is to decide whether to commit the prisoner, and a magistrate 
cannot commit a prisoner who is not there.  Committal 
hearings are thus distinguishable from non-Marian pretrial 
proceedings such as warrant applications, where there is no 
particular reason to expect the prisoner’s presence.  Chief 
Justice Marshall made that distinction in 1807 during a 
  
 79 2 & 3 Phil. & M., c. 10 (1555).  The language of the bail statute is similar.  
1 & 2 Phil. & M., c. 13 (1554). 
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colloquy in Ex parte Bollman:  “If a person makes an affidavit 
before a magistrate to obtain a warrant of arrest, such affidavit 
must necessarily be ex parte.  But how is it on a motion to 
commit, after the person is taken?  Must not the commitment 
be upon testimony given in presence of the prisoner?”80  
Marshall’s point here seems to be not so much that there is a 
legal requirement that committal proceedings be conducted in 
the prisoner’s presence, but that it would be strange to conduct 
them any other way.81 
Other evidence corroborates this theory.  A 1747 print 
by William Hogarth depicts a committal examination in the 
Guildhall magistrates’ court; the accused is clearly shown to be 
present while his accuser is sworn to testify against him.82  
Other prints from the same era show “[p]eople waiting their 
turn—prosecutors, accused, constables, the curious—simply 
st[anding] about.”83  Committal examinations were often 
conducted in the relatively informal setting of the justice’s 
residence parlor,84 so it is not even clear where the prisoner 
would have been kept if sequestered while the witnesses who 
brought him were deposed.   
The most compelling evidence of Marian procedure, 
however, is in the depositions themselves.  I obtained from the 
  
 80 Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 124 (1807) (Marshall, C.J.). 
 81 As Professor Davies notes, see Davies, supra note 10, at 631-32, the Court 
in Bollman ultimately held that an ex parte affidavit was admissible at a committal 
hearing, over counsel’s objection that “[t]he party arrested and brought before the 
magistrate for commitment, has a right to be confronted with his accuser, and to cross-
examine the witnesses produced against him.”  8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 120, 129.  But the 
Attorney General in that case had conceded that such evidence would be inadmissible 
at trial.  See id. at 115 (“It is true that none of the evidence now offered would be 
competent on the trial . . . .”).  That the Court was willing to allow an affidavit at a 
committal hearing does not prove the Court would treat it the same as a live Marian 
examination if the witness became unavailable before trial.  Marshall’s question 
suggests that the committal procedure followed in Bollman was not typical.  
 82 WILLIAM HOGARTH, INDUSTRY AND IDLENESS NO. 10: THE INDUSTRIOUS 
’PRENTICE ALDERMAN OF LONDON, THE IDLE ONE BROUGHT BEFORE HIM & IMPEACH’D 
BY HIS ACCOMPLICE (1747), available at http://www.victorianweb.org/painting/ 
18c/hogarth/17.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2006); see also J.M. BEATTIE, POLICING AND 
PUNISHMENT IN LONDON, 1660-1750, at 109 (2001) [hereinafter BEATTIE, POLICING AND 
PUNISHMENT] (describing this picture); John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-
Century Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 78-79 
(1983) (reproducing the picture). 
 83 J.M. Beattie, Sir John Fielding and Public Justice: The Bow Street 
Magistrates’ Court, 1754-1780, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 
15) [hereinafter Beattie, Public Justice] (citing prints from 1742 and 1750). 
 84 See J.M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND, 1660-1800, at 278-
79 (1986) [hereinafter BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS]; BEATTIE, POLICING AND 
PUNISHMENT, supra note 82, at 419; PETER KING, CRIME, JUSTICE, AND DISCRETION IN 
ENGLAND, 1740-1820, at 85 (2000). 
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London Metropolitan Archives a sample of committal 
depositions in twenty-seven cases from 1789.85  In twenty-two 
of the cases—more than 80%—the prisoner is expressly 
identified as being present in accusing witnesses’ testimony.  In 
one case, for example, the deposition states that the witness 
“particularly remembers that on the night of the robbery and a 
very short time before this Informant left his Shop the person 
now present who calls himself Joseph Pocock came into his 
Shop.”86  Another states that the witness “looked up and saw 
the Prisoner Present who says his name is James Netherhood 
take some Copper out of said Barge and give it to the other 
prisoner present.”87  Twenty other cases contain similar 
references.88  Two of those cases are particularly striking in 
  
 85 I located these materials by using the Old Bailey Proceedings Online 
database.  See The Proceedings of the Old Bailey, http://www.oldbaileyonline.org (last 
visited Nov. 27, 2006).  The depositions are not available online (unlike the trial 
proceedings), but the creators of the site did add archive citations for depositions and 
other “associated records” where those records survived.  To construct my sample, I 
searched for trials from 1789 with associated records likely to be committal depositions.  
Because I constructed the sample from the trial proceedings, it necessarily excludes 
cases where the prisoner was discharged before trial.  I also excluded cases where the 
associated records were located somewhere other than the London Metropolitan 
Archives.  Finally, because I was most interested in finding cases where the prisoner 
might have been represented by counsel at the committal hearing (which seemed more 
likely to yield evidence of cross-examination), I excluded cases where the prisoner 
appeared pro se at trial.  I located 13 cases with associated records coded as 
“information” and “examination,” and 54 cases with associated records coded only as 
“information.”  I chose a sample consisting of all 13 cases in the former category and an 
essentially random subset of 14 cases from the latter; I then obtained the records from 
the London Metropolitan Archives.  For purposes of whether the prisoner was present 
at the committal hearing or not, I would expect this sample to be reasonably 
representative.  
 86 Informations of George Bemfleet (Benfield) et al. against Joseph Pocock et 
al., OBSP 1789 Feb/53-57, 87 (Jan. 31 & Feb. 3, 1789) (emphasis added) (also includes 
three other similar references). 
 87 Information of Corbin Sangley against James Netherhood & Timothy 
Hopkins, OBSP 1789 Sept/92 (Aug. 14, 1789) (emphasis added) (also includes one other 
similar reference). 
 88 See Information of James Park against James Walton (Wharton), OBSP 
1789 Jan/20 (Dec. 15, 1788) (“the person present who saith his name is James 
Walton”); Examination of Robert Hutton against William Street & John Maidwell, 
OBSP 1789 Jan/19, 30 (Jan. 3 & 5, 1789) (“the two men present who say their names 
are William Street and John Maidwell”); Informations of William Morris et al. against 
Jacob Canter, OBSP 1789 Feb/16-23, 84 (Jan. 7 & 26, 1789) (“a person now present 
who calls himself Jacob Canter”; nine other similar references); Information of John 
Grimes against Cuthbert Rutledge et al., OBSP 1789 Jan/18, 53 (Jan. 8, 1789) (“he saw 
the persons present who say their names are Cuthbert Rutledge John Butler and John 
Freeman”); Information of George Forester against Christopher Daly (Daley), OBSP 
1789 Feb/41 (Feb. 14, 1789) (“he saw the person present who saith his name is 
Christopher Daley”); Information of Chaffon Edgell against William Cook, OBSP 1789 
Ap/69-70 (Mar. 25, 1789) (“the Person now present who calls himself William Cook”); 
Information of John Clarke against Thomas Denton et al., OBSP 1789 Ap/10 (Mar. 27, 
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that the prisoners were examined on one day and the witnesses 
deposed on another, yet the witnesses still identified the 
prisoners as present—evidently the prisoners were brought 
back for those depositions.89  Of the remaining five cases, two 
contain ambiguous indications that the prisoner was present,90 
  
1789) (“two persons now present who call themselves Thomas Denton and John 
Jones”); Information of Edward Smith against James Henley, OBSP 1789 Ap/73 (Apr. 
3, 1789) (“he did suspect the man present who says his name is James Henley”); 
Information of Joseph Barrett against Edward Lary, OBSP 1789 Ap/27 (Apr. 11, 1789) 
(“a person now present who calls himself Edward Lary”); Information of Thomas 
Lancaster against Edward Castledine, OBSP 1789 Ap/47, 76 (Apr. 22, 1789) (“[t]he 
person present who says his name is Edward Castledine”); Information of Thomas 
Beszant against David Coleman, OBSP 1789 Ju/35 (May 6, 1789) (“said Draft was 
presented for payment by a person now present who calls himself David Coleman”; one 
other similar reference); Information of James McManus against John Bannister, 
OBSP 1789 Ju/47 (May 7, 1789) (“he apprehended John Bannister the prisoner now 
present”); Information of Robert Tate against Edward Tapp, OBSP 1789 Ju/38 (May 9, 
1789) (“a person now present who calls himself Edward Tapp”); Information of Simon 
Wood against Joseph Lucas & James Rock, OBSP 1789 Jy/22 (June 26, 1789) (“saw the 
persons present who say their names are Joseph Lucas and James Rock”); Information 
of David Mackintosh against Francis Burrows, OBSP 1789 Sept/87 (Aug. 16, 1789) 
(“one of the men now present that calls himself Francis Burrows”); Information of John 
Fletcher against George Dawson & Deborah Dawson, OBSP 1789 Sept/90a-b (Aug. 18, 
1789) (“he met the person now present who calls herself Deborah Dawson”); 
Informations of John Roberts & John Clark against Thomas Girling, OBSP 1789 
Sept/81a-c, 82 (Aug. 18 & Sept. 11, 1789) (“Thomas Girling the Letter Carrier now 
present”; one other similar reference); Information of Mary Tollin against Edward 
Studsbury & Charles Burton, OBSP 1789 Sept/74 (Sept. 1, 1789) (“the person now 
present, who calls himself Edward Studsbury”; “the other person also now present, who 
calls himself Charles Burton”); Information of Catherine Baker against William 
Cunningham, OBSP 1789 Oct/59 (Oct. 10, 1789) (“has no doubt but that the person 
now present who calls himself William Cunningham is the man she saw lying down in 
the Passage as aforesaid”); Information of Mary Smith against Joseph Webb, OBSP 
1789 Oct/73 (Oct. 14, 1789) (“the prisoner now present, who calls himself Joseph 
Webb”).  Qualifications should be noted with respect to two of these cases.  First, in the 
Thomas Girling case, although multiple witnesses identified the prisoner as present, 
the archive file includes a second set of depositions taken about a month later that 
refer to the prisoner as being then in custody at Newgate.  See Informations of John 
Roberts et al. against Thomas Girling, OBSP 1789 Sept/81a-c, 82 (Aug. 18 & Sept. 11, 
1789).  Apparently the prisoner was committed upon the first set of depositions; it is 
unclear whether this second set (seemingly ex parte) were Marian committal 
depositions or not.  Second, in the Street and Maidwell case, although one person 
clearly identified both prisoners as present, another stated that “neither of the persons 
are present who was present at the loading of the said last mentioned Waggon”; it is 
unclear from context whether the persons referred to include either of the prisoners.  
Information of Robert Bygrave against William Street & John Maidwell, OBSP 1789 
Jan/30 (Jan. 5, 1789). 
 89 See Examination of Robert Hutton against William Street & John 
Maidwell, OBSP 1789 Jan/19, 30 (Jan. 3 & 5, 1789); Informations of William Morris et 
al. against Jacob Canter, OBSP 1789 Feb/16-23, 84 (Jan. 7 & 26, 1789). 
 90 In one case, the deposition refers to the prisoner as “William Ward now 
under Examination.”  Information of John Peacock against William Ward, OBSP 1789 
Ju/17 (May 6, 1789).  In the other, the deposition states that the witness “met the 
Prisoner who says her name is Eleanor Hays”; the prisoner’s own examination appears 
on the same document immediately after the witness’s deposition; and the prisoner 
begins by exclaiming that the witness has “Perjured himself,” suggesting she was 
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and three contain no indication either way.91  Overall, this 
evidence suggests that presence was not merely a routine 
feature of Marian procedure, but a near-universal one.  
The notion that Marian examinations were conducted in 
the prisoner’s absence seems to have originated in a late 
nineteenth-century treatise by English historian James 
Stephen.  In contrasting the Marian statutes with the 1848 
legislation explicitly requiring opportunity for cross-
examination, Stephen wrote that under the former “[t]he 
prisoner had no right to be, and probably never was, present.”92  
He cited no source for that claim, however; it was not carefully 
researched the way much of Stephen’s work was.  We can only 
speculate about his rationale.  If Stephen was inferring that 
the prisoner probably never was present merely because he had 
no express statutory right to be present, his conclusion is a non 
sequitur.  Whatever the rationale, Stephen’s claim seems 
impossible to reconcile with the evidence above, which shows 
that the prisoner was almost invariably present when his 
accusers testified against him at a committal hearing.93  
B. Presence as a Procedural Right 
Was presence more than a natural feature of Marian 
practice—was it also a procedural right?  The general rule that 
evidence must be given in the presence of the accused was 
settled long before the framing.  Hawkins, for example, had 
written that it was “a settled Rule, That in Cases of Life no 
Evidence is to be given against a Prisoner but in his 
Presence.”94  The exchange in Fenwick’s case suggested that 
  
present for his testimony.  Information of Fredreck Seabeck against Eleanor Hays, 
OBSP 1789 Dec/54 (Nov. 28, 1789). 
 91 Informations of Joseph Athinson et al. against William Patmore, OBSP 
1789 Feb/72a-b (Jan. 20 & 31, 1789); Informations of James Kerton et al. against 
Francis Fleming et al., OBSP 1789 Feb/60, 86 (Jan. 28, 1789); Informations of Nunn 
Ilston & Edward Vaughan Williams against Thomas Taylor, OBSP 1789 Dec/79 (Dec. 
9, 1789). 
 92 1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF 
ENGLAND 221 (London, MacMillan 1883). 
 93 Beattie writes in his Crime and the Courts in England that “[t]he Marian 
legislation gave the prisoner few rights at this stage of the investigation.  He was not to 
be told precisely what the evidence was against him, nor to be present when the 
deposition of his accuser was taken.”  BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS, supra note 84, 
at 271.  I am informed by the author, however, that the intent of this passage was 
merely to convey that the prisoner had no right to be present, and that normally he 
would have been present nonetheless.  E-mail from John Beattie to Robert Kry (Apr. 
22, 2006) (on file with author). 
 94 2 HAWKINS (1721), supra note 38, at 428 (footnote omitted). 
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this general rule might also apply in the specific context of 
Marian examinations.95  And the pervasive references to 
“presence” in the Marian depositions themselves raise a strong 
suspicion that presence was more than just a natural feature of 
Marian procedure.96  The strongest evidence, however, comes 
from three cases decided almost contemporaneously with the 
adoption of the Bill of Rights: King v. Radbourne,97 King v. 
Woodcock,98 and King v. Dingler.99   
Radbourne was a murder and petty treason trial of a 
maid accused of killing her mistress.  William Garrow, the 
most celebrated criminal defense lawyer of his day,100 
represented the prosecution.  The victim had been examined 
before she died by a justice of the peace; the case report 
specifically mentions that the examination was taken “in the 
presence of the prisoner,” “heard by the prisoner,” and 
“distinctly read over to her in the presence of ” the victim.101  
Garrow argued that the deposition was admissible under the 
Marian statutes:  
Garrow, for the Crown, . . . contended that Mrs. Morgan’s deposition 
was admissible in evidence . . . as an information taken by a regular 
magistrate, under the statutes of Philip & Mary; for it had been 
given in the presence and hearing of the prisoner, upon an oath 
lawfully administered to Mrs. Morgan, who had thereby called God 
to witness that what she said was true, and who had in the presence 
of the prisoner, made an additional attestation of its truth, by 
putting her signature thereto . . . .102 
The deposition was admitted, and the defendant convicted of 
murder.103 
  
 95 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. 
 96 See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text. 
 97 1 Leach 457, 168 Eng. Rep. 330 (1787) (reported 1789/1800). 
 98 1 Leach 500, 168 Eng. Rep. 352 (1789) (reported 1789). 
 99 2 Leach 561, 168 Eng. Rep. 383 (1791) (reported 1800).  The quotations 
that follow in the text are taken from the 1815 fourth edition of Leach’s Crown Cases 
that appears in the English Reports.  I note below instances in which Leach’s fourth 
edition differs materially from his earlier editions.  I am indebted to Professor Davies 
for drawing my attention to those differences.  In an attempt to verify the accuracy of 
Leach’s reporting, I also compared his reports to the earlier accounts in the Old Bailey 
Sessions Papers.  Although the reports are similar in many respects, there are material 
discrepancies, which I likewise note below. 
 100 See infra note 178. 
 101 Radbourne, 1 Leach at 459, 168 Eng. Rep. at 331-32.  
 102 Id. at 460-61, 168 Eng. Rep. at 332 (emphasis added).  
 103 Id. at 461-62, 168 Eng. Rep. at 332-33.  The decision was referred to the 
Twelve Judges—essentially, England’s en banc process for criminal cases—and 
affirmed.  Id. at 462, 168 Eng. Rep. at 333.  The version of Radbourne in the English 
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In Woodcock, the prisoner was charged with murdering 
his wife.  The victim was found injured in a ditch and taken to 
a poor-house, where a magistrate examined her before she 
died.  The court refused to admit the examination under the 
Marian statutes: 
[A Marian] deposition, if the deponent should die between the time 
of examination and the trial of the prisoner, may be substituted in 
the room of that viva voce testimony which the deponent, if living, 
could alone have given, and is admitted of necessity as evidence of 
the fact.  In the present case a doubt has arisen with the Court, to 
which doubt I entirely subscribe, Whether the examination of the 
deceased, taken in writing at the poor-house by Mr. Read, the 
Magistrate, is an examination of the nature I have last described?  It 
was not taken, as the statute directs, in a case where the prisoner was 
brought before him in custody; the prisoner therefore had no 
opportunity of contradicting the facts it contains.  It was not in the 
discharge of that part of Mr. Read’s duty by which he is, on hearing 
the witnesses, to bail or commit the prisoner; but it was a voluntary 
and extrajudicial act, performed at the request of the Overseer; and 
although it was a very proper and prudent act, yet being voluntary, 
and under circumstances where the Justice was not authorized to 
administer an oath, it cannot be admitted before a Jury as evidence; 
for no evidence can be legal unless it be given upon oath, judicially 
taken.104 
  
Reports is substantially the same as the version in Leach’s 1800 third edition.  See 2 
THOMAS LEACH, CASES IN CROWN LAW 512-20 (London 3d ed. 1800).  The version in 
Leach’s 1789 first edition is shorter; it states that the victim “gave an information upon 
oath, before a Justice of the Peace, which was read deliberately over to her in the 
presence and hearing of the prisoner,” but does not include arguments of counsel and 
therefore omits Garrow’s express tying of presence to admissibility under the Marian 
statutes.  See THOMAS LEACH, CASES IN CROWN LAW 399-401 (London 1st ed. 1789).  
Leach’s 1792 second edition italicizes the words “to her in the presence and hearing of 
the prisoner,” but otherwise is similar to the first edition.  See THOMAS LEACH, CASES 
IN CROWN LAW 363-64 (London 2d ed. 1792).  In the version in the Old Bailey Sessions 
Papers, Garrow argues that the information is admissible because it was “given in the 
presence of the prisoner,” but he makes that point as a general principle of evidence 
law without specific reference to the Marian statutes: 
[O]ne of the grounds of receiving such declarations, when made in the 
presence and hearing of the prisoner, is this; that when an innocent man is 
accused in a solemn manner, his innocent mind instantly revolts at the 
accusation; and he asserts his innocence, and denies his guilt; and therefore if 
he does not do so, when he hears the accusation, that is evidence at least to 
go to a Jury, that he did not object to it when he heard it.  
Trial of Henrietta Radbourne, Old Bailey Sessions Papers, July 11, 1787, at 750, 752. 
 104 King v. Woodcock, 1 Leach 500, 502, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 353 (1789) 
(citation omitted; emphasis added).   
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The court nevertheless told the jury it could consider the 
testimony as a dying declaration if given under apprehension of 
death; the jury convicted.105 
Dingler was another case in which the prisoner was 
accused of murdering his wife.  Abingdon, the magistrate, had 
examined the victim at the infirmary before she died, after the 
husband was in custody but outside his presence.  The 
defendant was represented at trial by William Garrow, the 
same lawyer who had represented the Crown in Radbourne 
four years earlier.  Garrow argued that the examination was 
inadmissible:  
[The Marian committal statute] enacts, “That such Justice or 
Justices, before whom any person shall be brought for manslaughter 
or felony, or for suspicion thereof, before he or they shall commit or 
send such prisoner to ward, shall take the examination of such 
prisoner, and information of those that bring him, of the fact and 
circumstances thereof, and the same, or so much thereof as shall be 
material to prove the felony, shall put in writing,” &c.  The 
Magistrate, therefore, is only authorized to take an examination of 
the person brought before him, and of those who bring him: this is 
the course which the law has prescribed to the Magistrate on these 
occasions; and when this course is pursued, the prisoner may have, as 
he is entitled to have, the benefit of cross-examination; but in the 
course which has been pursued by Mr. Abingdon, as the prisoner was 
not present, no judicial examination has been taken, as he could not 
have the benefit of cross-examination. . . . The authority of the 
Magistrate in such cases grows out of the statute; it is 
commensurate with the terms of it; and therefore it is utterly 
impossible, unless the prisoner had been present, that depositions 
thus taken can be read; and he cited the case of Rex v. Woodcock.106 
The court sustained the objection “on the authority of the case 
cited.”107 
  
 105 Id. at 504, 168 Eng. Rep. at 354.  The version of Woodcock in the English 
Reports is the same in relevant respects as the versions in all of Leach’s prior editions.  
See 2 LEACH (1800), supra note 103, at 563-68; LEACH (1792), supra note 103, at 397-
401; LEACH (1789), supra note 103, at 437-42.  The version in the Old Bailey Sessions 
Papers differs somewhat; among other things, where Leach reports the judge as stating 
that the deposition “was not taken, as the statute directs, in a case where the prisoner 
was brought before him in custody; the prisoner therefore had no opportunity of 
contradicting the facts it contains,” the Old Bailey Sessions Papers reports him as 
stating more ambiguously that Marian examinations are “taken where persons are in 
custody, and when the justice hears the examination of witnesses against persons in 
custody.”  Trial of William Woodcock, Old Bailey Sessions Papers, Jan. 14, 1789, at 95, 
111. 
 106 King v. Dingler, 2 Leach 561, 562-63, 168 Eng. Rep. 383, 384 (1791) 
(citation omitted; emphasis added). 
 107 Id. at 563, 168 Eng. Rep. at 384.  The version of Dingler in the English 
Reports is substantially the same as the version in Leach’s 1800 third edition.  See 2 
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Radbourne, Woodcock, and Dingler confirm that, by the 
framing era, Marian examinations were normally conducted in 
the prisoner’s presence.  The deposition in Radbourne was 
taken “in the presence of the prisoner.”108  Although Davies 
thinks that merely reflects the fact that the petty treason 
charge independently entitled the prisoner to be present,109 
Garrow expressly argued that presence was relevant under the 
Marian statutes—the deposition was properly taken “under the 
statutes of Philip & Mary; for it had been given in the presence 
and hearing of the prisoner.”110  Likewise, in Woodcock, the 
court distinguished the deposition at hand from one taken “as 
the statute directs, in a case where the prisoner was brought 
before [the magistrate] in custody,” affording an “opportunity of 
contradicting the facts it contains.”111  And in Dingler, Garrow 
distinguished the deposition at issue from a committal 
examination on the ground that it was not taken in the 
prisoner’s presence.112  All three cases thus confirm that Marian 
examinations were normally conducted in the prisoner’s 
presence.   
The three cases do more than reveal how Marian 
examinations were normally conducted—they also speak to 
admissibility.  In Radbourne, the deposition was “admissible in 
  
LEACH (1800), supra note 103, at 638-41.  Professor Davies supposes that Dingler first 
appeared in Leach’s 1792 second edition, see Davies, supra note 5, at 157 n.164, but 
that edition in fact only reports cases through the July Session of 1791 and therefore 
does not include Dingler’s September trial, although the case is mentioned in a 
marginal note to Woodcock.  See LEACH (1792), supra note 103, at 401 n.(a).  In the Old 
Bailey Sessions Papers, Garrow’s argument is more discursive, but he makes similar 
points.  See Trial of George Dingler, Old Bailey Sessions Papers, Sept. 14, 1791, at 468, 
473-77.  That report is discussed infra notes 166-76 and accompanying text.  
 108 King v. Radbourne, 1 Leach 457, 459, 168 Eng. Rep. 330, 331 (1787).  
Professor Davies observes that Leach’s first edition reported that the deposition was 
“read” rather than “taken” in the prisoner’s presence.  See Davies, supra note 10, at 
607-09.  But the report states that the deposition was “read deliberately over to her”—
i.e., the witness—“in the presence and hearing of the prisoner.”  LEACH (1789), supra 
note 103, at 400 (emphasis added).  In other words, the witness and the prisoner were 
both present when the prisoner was apprised of the witness’s testimony.  That 
arrangement is no more or less conducive to cross-examination than taking the 
deposition in the prisoner’s presence in the first instance; in either case the prisoner 
can question the witness about her testimony unless the magistrate affirmatively 
prevents her from doing so. 
 109 Davies, supra note 5, at 165. 
 110 Radbourne, 1 Leach at 461, 168 Eng. Rep. at 332 (emphasis added).  As 
noted supra note 103, this quotation appears in Leach’s 1800 third edition but not in 
his prior editions.  Nevertheless, Leach’s third edition, together with the Old Bailey 
Sessions Papers report, see supra note 103, strongly suggest that Garrow argued 
presence was relevant for reasons unrelated to the treason statute.   
 111 King v. Woodcock, 1 Leach 500, 502, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 353 (1789). 
 112 Dingler, 2 Leach at 562-63, 168 Eng. Rep. at 384. 
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evidence . . . for it had been given in the presence and hearing 
of the prisoner.”113  In Woodcock, the deposition was not 
admissible under the Marian statutes because the prisoner was 
not “brought before [the magistrate] in custody.”114  And in 
Dingler, Garrow argued that it was “utterly impossible, unless 
the prisoner had been present, that depositions thus taken can 
be read.”115  Presence was thus not only a natural consequence 
of Marian procedure, but a procedural right—unless the 
prisoner was present, the deposition could not be read at trial.  
Later sources confirm that interpretation, routinely citing 
these cases as holding that depositions taken in the prisoner’s 
absence were inadmissible.116   
Davies makes much of a distinction between what he 
terms the “strong” and “nuanced” versions of Justice Scalia’s 
claim that these cases “rejected” the “statutory derogation 
view.”117  As he notes, Woodcock and Dingler did not hold that 
depositions taken in conformity with the Marian statutes were 
inadmissible if taken ex parte; rather, they held that the 
depositions at issue were not taken in conformity with the 
Marian statutes.118  But that distinction is academic because 
the reason the depositions were held not to have conformed to 
the Marian statutes was that they were taken ex parte.  There 
is no practical difference between excluding Marian depositions 
taken ex parte and holding that depositions taken ex parte are 
not Marian depositions and for that reason inadmissible.  In 
either case, presence is a condition of admissibility. 
Davies also objects to the timing of the decisions:  
Leach’s reports of Radbourne and Woodcock were not published 
until 1789, at most a few months before Congress proposed the 
  
 113 Radbourne, 1 Leach at 460-61, 168 Eng. Rep. at 332 (emphasis added). 
 114 Woodcock, 1 Leach at 502, 168 Eng. Rep. at 353.  The deposition was 
excluded because it was taken “under circumstances where the Justice was not 
authorized to administer an oath.”  Id.  One of those “circumstances,” however, was 
that the prisoner was not “brought before [the magistrate] in custody.”  Id. 
 115 Dingler, 2 Leach at 563, 168 Eng. Rep. at 384.   
 116 See People v. Restell, 3 Hill 289, 300 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842) (citing Woodcock 
and Dingler); Rex v. Smith, Holt 614, 614-16, 171 Eng. Rep. 357, 357-60 (1817) 
(apparently citing Radbourne); ARCHBOLD, supra note 11, at *85 (citing Radbourne); 1 
CHITTY, supra note 11, at 79 & n.(l) (citing Woodcock and Dingler); 4 HAWKINS (1795), 
supra note 11, at 423 (citing Woodcock and Dingler); PEAKE (1801), supra note 11, at 
40-41 (citing Radbourne and Dingler); PHILLIPPS, supra note 11, at 277 & n.3 (citing 
Woodcock); 2 STARKIE, supra note 11, at *487-89 (citing Woodcock and Dingler). 
 117 Davies, supra note 5, at 162-64; see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 
54 n.5 (2004) (“[T]o the extent [ex parte] Marian examinations were admissible, it was 
only because the statutes derogated from the common law.”).   
 118 See Davies, supra note 5, at 166-69.   
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Sixth Amendment for ratification; his report of Dingler was not 
published until after the Sixth Amendment was ratified.  
Davies argues that these decisions are not valid evidence of 
original meaning because the reports would not have been 
widely available in the United States when the Sixth 
Amendment was framed.119   
That argument assumes, incorrectly, that English 
evidence is relevant only if published in a treatise or case 
report shipped to America before the framing.  That is too 
narrow a view of the sources of information on which American 
legal thinkers relied.  Many colonial lawyers, for example, 
trained in London and thus were directly exposed to English 
practices and ideas.  One historian writes that “[a] far greater 
number [of colonial lawyers] than is generally known, received 
their legal education in London in the Inns of Court; and the 
influence, on the American Bar, of these English-bred lawyers, 
especially in the more southerly Colonies, was most potent.”120  
Another historian counts more than 115 American lawyers who 
trained between 1760 and 1775 in London, where they could 
“come into personal contact with some of England’s leading 
lawyers and judges.”121  He finds that “[t]he professional 
influence which these English-trained lawyers had on the 
colonial bar is beyond imagination.”122  At least nine of the 
thirty-one lawyers at the Constitutional Convention trained in 
England.123  Because colonial lawyers were directly exposed to 
English practices and ideas, English evidence is relevant 
whether or not it appeared in a published treatise or case 
report shipped to the colonies.   
Furthermore, the way Marian examinations were 
conducted in England in 1787, 1789, or 1791 is relevant to how 
they were conducted during the preceding decades.  
Radbourne, Woodcock, and Dingler do not purport to change 
Marian committal procedure in any way; they simply confirm 
what that procedure already was.  None of the cases excluded a 
  
 119 Id. at 153-62.  I take no position on whether 1789 or 1791 is the more 
relevant date for assessing original meaning because I do not view that two-year 
difference as having much practical significance.  
 120 CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 188 (1911). 
 121 1 ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN 
AMERICA 33 (1965). 
 122 Id. at 36. 
 123 See BERGER, supra note 36, at 87 n.160 (noting that four had studied in the 
Inner Temple and five in the Middle Temple); WARREN, supra note 120, at 211 (“four 
had studied in the Inner Temple, and one at Oxford, under Blackstone”). 
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committal deposition taken ex parte—Radbourne admitted a 
properly taken deposition, and Woodcock and Dingler rejected 
attempts to use the Marian statutes to admit non-committal 
depositions.  The cases suggest that magistrates in the late 
eighteenth century were becoming more assertive in 
investigating crime by taking voluntary depositions unrelated 
to their statutory committal function,124 and that courts were 
unwilling to expand the statutes to reach those depositions.  
But they do not suggest any novelty in how committal 
examinations were conducted. 
Radbourne, Woodcock, and Dingler are also evidence of 
the conditions of admissibility that were understood to exist 
during the preceding decades.  They are relevant, not as a 
source of new legal rights, but as a reflection of existing 
understandings of legal rights.  Significantly, the rule they 
acknowledged was not invented from scratch, but was a 
straightforward reading of the statutory text:  The statutes 
authorized a justice of the peace to examine only a suspect and 
the witnesses who brought him; the prisoner in such a case 
would necessarily be present; and an examination not taken 
“as the statute directs” was not admissible under its 
authority.125  Several other English authorities followed that 
same line of textual reasoning.126  And the way English 
authorities interpreted statutory text is a reasonable proxy for 
how Americans would have interpreted similar text in their 
own committal statutes.  As indeed they did:  When the North 
  
 124 This is consistent with other evidence that magistrates were taking a more 
aggressive role in investigating and prosecuting crime during this era.  See, e.g., 
Beattie, Public Justice, supra note 83, at 9 (describing the “Bow Street runners,” the 
“first quasi-official detective policemen” directed by magistrates in the mid-eighteenth 
century); id. at 23-35 (describing the “re-examination” procedure first used by Bow 
Street magistrates in the mid-eighteenth century). 
 125 King v. Woodcock, 1 Leach 500, 502, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 353 (1789); see also 
King v. Dingler, 2 Leach 561, 562-63, 168 Eng. Rep. 383, 384 (1791).  
 126 See King v. Eriswell, 3 T.R. 707, 710 n.(c), 100 Eng. Rep. 815, 817 n.(c) 
(K.B. 1790) (reporter’s note 1797) (“Nor [are committal examinations admissible] since 
that statute, unless the party accused be present, . . . see the words of the [Marian 
statutes].”); Rex v. Forbes, Holt 599 n.*, 599 n.*, 171 Eng. Rep. 354 n.*, 354 n.* (1814) 
(“[T]he intention of the statute of Philip and Mary is sufficiently plain.  It is, that the 
prisoner shall be present whilst the witness actually delivers his testimony . . . .”); 2 
STARKIE, supra note 11, at *487-88 (“[W]here the informations are taken before a 
magistrate, the words of the statute strongly imply that the prisoner is supposed to be 
present, for the Justice is to take the examination of the prisoner, and the informations 
of those who bring the prisoner; and if they were to be taken in the prisoner’s absence 
he would lose the benefit of cross-examination . . . .”).  But see Rex v. Smith, Holt 614, 
615, 171 Eng. Rep. 357, 360 (1817) (“[T]he statute did not mention the prisoner’s 
presence at all.  Undoubtedly, however, the decisions established the point, that the 
prisoner ought to be present, that he might cross-examine.”).  
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Carolina court held in Webb in 1794 that “our [committal 
statute] clearly implies the depositions to be read, must be 
taken in [the prisoner’s] presence,”127 it was drawing the same 
textual inference that Woodcock and Dingler had drawn just a 
few years earlier. 
Nevertheless, the rule articulated by Radbourne, 
Woodcock, and Dingler was not universally accepted.  In the 
1790 case of King v. Eriswell, the King’s Bench divided over 
whether the ex parte examination of a pauper who had become 
insane could be admitted in a suit to charge a town with his 
care.128  In defending admissibility, Justice Buller relied by 
analogy on his construction of the Marian statutes:  “Where an 
act is judicially done, it is not necessary that the person to be 
affected by it should be present in order to make it evidence 
against him, and therefore depositions taken by a justice of a 
person who afterwards died, though taken in the absence of the 
prisoner, must be read.  So it was determined by all the Judges 
in Radburn’s case.”129  Two other judges, Grose and Kenyon, 
disagreed with Buller as to pauper examinations but did not 
dispute his premise that ex parte Marian depositions were 
admissible, instead dismissing it as a statutory exception to the 
common-law rule.  Grose wrote: 
Evidence, though upon oath, to affect an absent person, is 
incompetent, because he cannot cross examine; as nothing can be 
more unjust than that a person should be bound by evidence which 
he is not permitted to hear.  Before the Statute of Philip & Mary, a 
deposition taken before the justice of the county where the murder 
was committed was not evidence, even though the party died or was 
unable to travel.  Why?  Because although the justice had 
jurisdiction to enquire into the fact, the common law did not permit a 
person accused to be affected by an examination taken in his 
absence, because he could not cross examine; and therefore that 
statute was made.130 
Chief Justice Kenyon added: 
Examinations upon oath, except in the excepted cases, are of no avail 
unless they are made in a cause or proceeding depending between 
the parties to be affected by them, and where each has an 
opportunity of cross-examining the witness . . . . It has been said that 
there are cases where examinations are admitted, namely, before the 
coroner, and before magistrates in cases of felony. . . . Those 
  
 127 State v. Webb, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 103, 104 (Super. L. 1794).   
 128 King v. Eriswell, 3 T.R. 707, 100 Eng. Rep. 815 (K.B. 1790) (reported 1790). 
 129 Id. at 713-14, 100 Eng. Rep. at 819 (Buller, J.) (citation omitted).  
 130 Id. at 710, 100 Eng. Rep. at 817 (Grose, J.) (reporter’s notes omitted). 
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exceptions alluded to are founded on the Statutes of Philip & Mary; 
and that they go no further is abundantly proved. . . . [W]ithout 
stating the cases which occur on this head, I will do little more than 
refer to the case of The King v. Paine.  That was not loosely decided, 
but was the opinion of this Court assisted by the Court of Common 
Pleas.  In Salkeld it is expressly said that the rule cannot be 
extended further than the particular case of felony; and in the other 
book the Chief Justice declared that the depositions were not 
evidence; and a weighty reason is given, namely, “The defendant not 
being present when they were taken before the mayor, and so had 
lost the benefit of a cross-examination.”131 
The fourth judge, Ashhurst, thought Buller’s position on 
pauper examinations compelled by precedent, though “[i]f this 
were a new case, I should be strongly of opinion that the 
evidence given ought not to have been received, as being 
hearsay evidence.”132  He stated no view on ex parte Marian 
depositions, but since he was on the court that decided 
Woodcock a year earlier,133 it is doubtful he agreed with Buller 
on that specific point.134 
Eriswell admittedly provides evidence that the 
admissibility of ex parte Marian depositions was still disputed 
at the time of the framing.  Buller specifically states that 
Marian depositions were admissible even if “taken in the 
absence of the prisoner,”135 and Grose and Kenyon never clearly 
dispute that premise.136  While Buller says nothing about 
whether committal depositions were normally taken in the 
  
 131 Id. at 722-23, 100 Eng. Rep. at 823-24 (Kenyon, C.J.) (citation, reporter’s 
note omitted). 
 132 Id. at 720, 100 Eng. Rep. at 822 (Ashhurst, J.). 
 133 See King v. Woodcock, 1 Leach 500, 500, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 352 (1789) 
(identifying Ashhurst as “present”).  The presiding judge’s statement that “a doubt has 
arisen with the Court, to which doubt I entirely subscribe,” seems to indicate that the 
other judges present shared his concerns.  See id. at 502, 168 Eng. Rep. at 353. 
 134 In 1801, the year after Buller died, ex parte pauper examinations were 
ruled inadmissible.  See King v. Ferry Frystone, 2 East 54, 102 Eng. Rep. 289 (K.B. 
1801). 
 135 Eriswell, 3 T.R. at 713-14, 100 Eng. Rep. at 819 (Buller, J.). 
 136 Starkie, however, did interpret Kenyon’s reference to Paine as disputing 
Buller’s premise.  See 2 STARKIE, supra note 11, at *488 n.(c) (“It seems to have been 
the opinion of Ld. Kenyon . . . that depositions so taken [ex parte] were not admissible; 
and he refers to Payne’s case (as reported 5 Mod. 163), and terms the objection there 
taken to admitting the deposition in evidence, namely, the loss of cross-examination, a 
weighty objection.”); id. at *491-92 (“[H]e immediately afterwards laid great stress upon 
the case of The King v. Paine . . . . It cannot therefore be inferred that Lord Kenyon 
fully acceded to the admissibility of such evidence, although in the course of his 
argument, assuming them to be exceptions, he denied the consequences attempted to 
be deduced from them.”). 
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prisoner’s absence, he at least contemplates the possibility that 
they might be taken that way.137 
It is remarkable, however, that the only authority 
Buller relies on—Radbourne—squarely refutes his position.  
The deposition there was “given in the presence and hearing of 
the prisoner,” and the prosecution counsel expressly stated that 
the Marian statutes required as much.138  That discrepancy was 
not lost on commentators.  When Thomas Peake reprinted 
Eriswell in 1801, he inserted a footnote in Buller’s opinion 
recounting that Leach’s report of Radbourne “expressly stated 
that the deposition was taken in the presence of the prisoner”; 
that Peake had reviewed the magistrate’s statement in the 
sessions papers and found it “agreeable to this report”; and 
that he had reviewed a manuscript copy of the case and found 
that it did not “appear that the point, whether a deposition 
taken in the absence of the prisoner was evidence or not, was 
at all submitted to the consideration of the judges.”139  Leonard 
MacNally wrote in 1802 that Leach’s account “varies 
materially” from Buller’s; that in the former the deposition was 
“deliberately read over to [the witness] in the presence and 
hearing of the prisoner”; and that “[t]he words in italics are 
omitted by the learned judge.”140  Thomas Starkie wrote in 1824 
that “[Buller] refers to Radbourne’s case . . . ; but in that case 
the deposition was taken in the hearing of the prisoner, and of 
course the question did not arise”;141 he described Kenyon as 
  
 137 Three years after Eriswell, a court in a (noncriminal) paternity case also 
cited the Marian statutes in passing for the point that an “examination . . . taken 
before a magistrate in the course of a judicial proceeding . . . is certainly admissible 
evidence,” even though the putative father there had argued that the paternity 
examination was “not taken in the presence of the party to be affected by it.”  King v. 
Ravenstone, 5 T.R. 373, 374, 101 Eng. Rep. 209, 209 (K.B. 1793).  For contrary 
American authority, see Dunwiddie v. Commonwealth, 3 Ky. (Hard.) 290, 290 (1808). 
 138 King v. Radbourne, 1 Leach 457, 459-61, 168 Eng. Rep. 330, 331-32 (1787).  
As noted supra note 103, all the reports of Radbourne are clear that the deposition was 
taken in the prisoner’s presence (or at least read back to the witness in the prisoner’s 
presence), although only some include counsel’s argument making presence a condition 
of admissibility.  Leach in his 1792 second edition italicized the words “to her in the 
presence and hearing of the prisoner” that had appeared in his 1789 first edition before 
Eriswell was decided, see LEACH (1792), supra note 103, at 363; that revision was 
evidently a direct response to Buller’s argument.   
 139 PEAKE (1801), supra note 11, app. 1, at 144 n.*.  The last reference is 
apparently to the statement of the case by the presiding judge on submission to the 
Twelve Judges.  See supra note 103. 
 140 MACNALLY, supra note 11, at 307 n.*. 
 141 2 STARKIE, supra note 11, at *488 n.(c) (citation omitted); see also id. at 
*491 (“It is however remarkable, that in Radbourn’s case the information was taken in 
the presence of the prisoner.” (footnote omitted)). 
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merely having assumed the admissibility of such evidence for 
the sake of argument.142  Most striking is a footnote that the 
case reporters, Durnford and East, inserted in their 1797 
edition.  Where Grose had written “Before the statute of Philip 
& Mary, a deposition taken before the justice of the county 
where the murder was committed was not evidence, even 
though the party died or was unable to travel,” they added:  
“Nor since that statute, unless the party accused be 
present . . . ; see the words of the [Marian statutes].”143   
This highly negative reception suggests that, even 
around the time Eriswell was decided, the prevailing view in 
the legal community was that Buller’s dictum had misstated 
the law.  As a judge, Buller was respected for his legal abilities 
but was fairly reactionary on criminal procedure matters.144  
Eriswell may well be an instance of that. 
C. Conclusion 
Marian depositions were routinely conducted in the 
prisoner’s presence, a natural consequence of the statutory text 
and the function of a committal hearing.  At some point before 
the framing, that practice hardened into a procedural right.  
The timing is difficult to pinpoint because, so long as Marian 
depositions were conducted the way they were normally 
conducted, the question did not arise.  The catalysts for the 
principle’s express recognition in reported cases were not ex 
parte committal hearings, but attempts to stretch the statutes 
to non-committal contexts where presence was not routine.  
Courts then had to decide what features of committal 
examinations rendered their admission acceptable.  One such 
  
 142 See supra note 136. 
 143 3 CHARLES DURNFORD & EDWARD HYDE EAST, TERM REPORTS IN THE 
COURT OF KING’S BENCH 710 n.(c) (London, Strahan new ed. 1797).  The note does not 
appear in Durnford and East’s original 1790 report, see 3 CHARLES DURNFORD & 
EDWARD HYDE EAST, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE COURT OF 
KING’S BENCH 710 (London, Strahan & Woodfall 1790), or in Peake’s 1801 reprint, see 
PEAKE (1801), supra note 11, app. 1, at 140-41, but it appears in later editions of the 
Term Reports, including the 1817 edition in the English Reports, see King v. Eriswell, 3 
T.R. 707, 710 n.(c), 100 Eng. Rep. 815, 817 n.(c) (K.B. 1790). 
 144 See, e.g., JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 
212-16 (2003) (describing Buller’s role in dismantling the accomplice-corroboration 
rule).  I leave to the reader the relevance of Buller’s ascribed views on family discipline.  
See JAMES GILLRAY, JUDGE THUMB, OR—PATENT STICKS FOR FAMILY CORRECTION: 
WARRANTED LAWFUL! (1782), available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Judge_ 
Thumb.jpg (last visited Nov. 27, 2006). 
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feature, they determined, was the prisoner’s presence; and thus 
a confrontation right was read into the Marian statutes. 
III. CROSS-EXAMINATION 
Crawford did not require mere presence as a condition 
of admissibility, but also opportunity for cross-examination.  
This section examines that further requirement.   
A. Background 
While the statutory text invites the inference that 
prisoners were routinely present for committal depositions, it 
contains no express indication whether cross-examination was 
contemplated.  That does not mean, however, that one should 
assume no opportunity for cross-examination existed. 
The admissibility of a Marian deposition has only ever 
depended on whether the prisoner had an opportunity for cross-
examination—not on whether cross-examination actually 
occurred.145  The mere fact that cross-examination was unusual, 
therefore, would not disprove the cross-examination rule; all 
that matters is the opportunity.  Furthermore, cross-
examination need not have been affirmatively invited by the 
magistrate (although that was apparently done by the early 
nineteenth century).146  So long as the prisoner was present, 
opportunity for cross-examination would require only that the 
magistrate not interfere if the prisoner sought to ask questions.  
Viewed in that light, statutory silence should not be taken to 
indicate that no opportunity for cross-examination existed.  
The statutes did not mention cross-examination, but nor did 
they affirmatively direct the magistrate to prohibit it. 
If cross-examination never took place, one could argue 
that the opportunity was so theoretical that the Framers would 
not have attached any significance to it.  It therefore makes 
sense to inquire whether cross-examination at committal 
hearings likely ever occurred.  Two considerations suggest it 
was probably very rare before the second half of the eighteenth 
century, although developments over that period may have 
made it less anomalous. 
  
 145 See, e.g., various sources cited supra notes 11-13. 
 146 In Smith, the prisoner was expressly offered the opportunity to cross-
examine.  See Rex v. Smith, Holt 614, 614, 171 Eng. Rep. 357, 357 (1817) (“The 
prisoner was asked whether he would chuse to put any questions to him, but declined 
to do so.”). 
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The first concerns the prisoner’s incentive to cross-
examine.  The Marian statutes did not give justices of the peace 
any express authority to discharge prisoners; their only options 
were to commit for trial or release on bail, according to the 
seriousness of the offense charged.147  Because the statutes did 
not contemplate discharge, the prisoner had little incentive to 
challenge adverse testimony at the committal hearing.  As legal 
historians have documented, however, during the eighteenth 
century magistrates began exercising an extra-statutory power 
of discharge, releasing a felony suspect if the evidence was 
insufficient.148  As a result, the prisoner had a much greater 
incentive to test the sufficiency of the prosecutor’s case.   
The second development concerns the involvement of 
lawyers.  At the start of the eighteenth century, counsel could 
appear for a criminal defendant at trial only in cases of treason 
or misdemeanor, not felony.149  The rule against felony counsel 
receded during the eighteenth century, starting in the 1730s.150  
Nevertheless, for many decades, counsel could perform only 
limited functions at trial—a lawyer could examine and cross-
examine witnesses but could not argue his client’s case to the 
jury.151  Because of those restrictions, cross-examination was an 
utterly central component of a criminal defense lawyer’s skill 
set—Langbein calls it “nearly the only tool in defense counsel’s 
kit.”152   
The rule against felony counsel was a rule of 
appearance in the trial court; it did not extend to pretrial 
assistance.153  Nonetheless, if lawyers were not involved at trial, 
  
 147 See BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS, supra note 84, at 272; BEATTIE, 
POLICING AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 82, at 95-97; LANGBEIN, supra note 19, at 7.  
 148 See BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS, supra note 84, at 274-76; BEATTIE, 
POLICING AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 82, at 104-07; KING, supra note 84, at 88; 
LANGBEIN, supra note 144, at 47, 273-74. 
 149 See J.M. Beattie, Scales of Justice: Defense Counsel and the English 
Criminal Trial in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, 9 LAW & HIST. REV. 221, 
221 (1991) [hereinafter Beattie, Scales of Justice]. 
 150 See BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS, supra note 84, at 356-57; LANGBEIN, 
supra note 144, at 167-77; Beattie, Scales of Justice, supra note 149, at 226-30; 
Landsman, supra note 76, at 533-48. 
 151 See LANGBEIN, supra note 144, at 171, 254-55.  The right to full assistance 
of counsel developed earlier in the American colonies than in England.  See 1 CHROUST, 
supra note 121, at 42-44. 
 152 LANGBEIN, supra note 144, at 283; see also id. at 291-96; BEATTIE, CRIME 
AND THE COURTS, supra note 84, at 361-62; Beattie, Scales of Justice, supra note 149, at 
234-35; Landsman, supra note 76, at 535-37, 539-42, 548-57. 
 153 See LANGBEIN, supra note 144, at 129.  Moreover, even after lawyers were 
permitted at trial, only barristers (counsel) could represent a defendant at trial, but 
either barristers or solicitors (attorneys) might participate in pretrial hearings.  See 
 
530 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:2 
their involvement in pretrial hearings was probably rare at 
best.  By the mid-eighteenth century, however, lawyers began 
to appear at some committal hearings.154  A lawyer’s 
involvement would increase the likelihood of cross-examination 
at such a proceeding.  A lawyer would not have any greater 
right to cross-examine than the client he represented; and if a 
prisoner had a right to cross-examine, involvement of a lawyer 
was by no means necessary to his exercise of that right;155 but 
as a practical matter, the assistance of counsel would make it 
more likely that any opportunity to cross-examine would be 
exploited.156  Cross-examination at trial was already the most 
important component of defense counsel’s work; a lawyer 
seeking to justify his fee for assisting at a committal hearing 
would likely take advantage of any opportunity to cross-
examine the forum presented.157   
As one might predict from those two developments, 
sources from this period do indeed reveal the advent of cross-
examination at some committal hearings, as well as the first 
clear articulations of the view that opportunity to cross-
examine—like presence—was a procedural right critical to the 
admissibility of a Marian deposition.  I examine those sources 
in the following two sections, first considering reported cases 
and treatises and then turning to other sources.   
B. Reported Cases and Treatises 
Marian procedure collided with cross-examination 
rights in the 1739 case of King v. Westbeer.158  The defendant 
  
ALLYSON N. MAY, THE BAR AND THE OLD BAILEY, 1750-1850, at 89-90 (2003); infra 
notes 194-204, 215-23 and accompanying text.   
 154 See BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS, supra note 84, at 278-79 (citing a 
magistrate’s complaint from the 1740s about “Newgate Solicitors” at committal 
hearings); BEATTIE, POLICING AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 82, at 112; MAY, supra 
note 153, at 89-90; Beattie, Public Justice, supra note 83, at 33-35, 43-44; infra notes 
194-223 and accompanying text.  As these sources make clear, there is no substance to 
Davies’ claim that it “goes without saying that, even if the arrestee had been present 
for the taking of a witness’s Marian deposition, he would not have been represented by 
counsel at that time.”  Davies, supra note 5, at 170.  
 155 See Cox v. Coleridge, 1 B. & C. 37, 54, 107 Eng. Rep. 15, 21 (K.B. 1822) 
(Best, J.) (noting that “opportunity for cross-examination” need not include “cross-
examining by counsel or attorney”). 
 156 See LANGBEIN, supra note 144, at 34-35 (noting that most prisoners 
probably could not cross-examine effectively (quoting BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS, 
supra note 84, at 350-51)); Beattie, Scales of Justice, supra note 149, at 234 (same). 
 157 In addition, increasing lawyer involvement at trial would tend to 
crystallize evidentiary rules.  See LANGBEIN, supra note 144, at 243. 
 158 1 Leach 12, 168 Eng. Rep. 108 (1739) (reported 1789). 
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there was charged with theft; an accomplice, Lulham, had 
implicated him in a committal examination but died before 
trial.  Defense counsel argued that “admitting his deposition to 
be read in evidence would injure the prisoner, inasmuch as he 
would lose the benefit which might otherwise have arisen from 
a cross-examination.”159  The report continues: “The 
[prosecution counsel] replied, and the point was very much 
debated.  But the Court over-ruled the objection, and admitted 
Lulham’s information to be read; though they said it would not 
be conclusive unless it were strongly corroborated by other 
testimony.”160 
Although Westbeer admitted an examination over the 
objection that it denied the prisoner his right to cross-examine, 
the case does not necessarily show that magistrates refused to 
permit questioning by prisoners at committal hearings, or that 
depositions were routinely taken in the prisoner’s absence.  The 
case is unusual in that the deposition was taken from an 
accomplice at what appears to have been the accomplice’s own 
committal hearing.161  The examination was thus conducted in 
the prisoner’s (Lulham’s) presence but became ex parte when 
read against a different defendant (Westbeer).  Those 
circumstances suggest why the case was “very much debated” 
and the court’s ruling so qualified.  Courts in 1739 were not yet 
willing to condition admissibility on presence or opportunity for 
cross-examination, but in unusual cases where the normal 
features of committal depositions were absent, their admission 
was controversial.162  
Contrast Westbeer with Woodcock and Dingler.  In 
Woodcock, the deposition was excluded because “[i]t was not 
taken, as the statute directs, in a case where the prisoner was 
brought before [the magistrate] in custody; the prisoner 
  
 159 Id. at 12, 168 Eng. Rep. at 109. 
 160 Id.; see also BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS, supra note 84, at 273 & n.15 
(mentioning a similar unreported case from 1749).  
 161 The accomplice “made a full confession in writing” before giving his sworn 
statement, Westbeer, 1 Leach at 12, 168 Eng. Rep. at 109; the unsworn confession 
suggests the accomplice himself was being committed.  Leach and Peake, however, 
both apparently assumed the defendant was present.  See 4 HAWKINS (1795), supra 
note 11, at 423 (citing Westbeer for the point that an accomplice’s Marian deposition 
was admissible if taken “in the presence of the prisoner”); PEAKE (1801), supra note 11, 
at 40-41 (same).   
 162 Alternatively, the court’s corroboration requirement could reflect the more 
general accomplice-corroboration rule rather than the ex parte character of the 
testimony, although Langbein states that the accomplice-corroboration rule did not 
emerge until the 1740s.  LANGBEIN, supra note 144, at 203. 
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therefore had no opportunity of contradicting the facts it 
contains.”163  The court thus treated presence as relevant not for 
its own sake, but because it would afford the prisoner an 
“opportunity of contradicting” the witness’s testimony.  The use 
of the word “contradict” rather than “cross-examine” presents 
an ambiguity.  But the defendant was not literally denied an 
opportunity to “contradict” the witness; he could have given a 
contradictory account at trial after the deposition was read.  
Implicit in the court’s holding is that the defendant was denied 
an opportunity to contradict the witness at a time when the 
witness could be required to respond to the contradictions—
which is, in substance, an opportunity to cross-examine.164   
Garrow’s argument in Dingler, as reported by Leach, is 
unambiguous:  “[W]hen [the statutory] course is pursued, the 
prisoner may have, as he is entitled to have, the benefit of 
cross-examination; but in the course which has been pursued 
by Mr. Abingdon, as the prisoner was not present, no judicial 
examination has been taken, as he could not have the benefit of 
cross-examination.”165  Garrow thus saw opportunity to cross-
examine as both a justification for the right to be present and 
as a free-standing right to which the prisoner was “entitled.” 
Another account of Dingler published in the Old Bailey 
Sessions Papers in 1791 confirms the significance of cross-
examination.166  In that report, Garrow sought to show what 
mischief would ensue from ex parte depositions by posing a 
hypothetical in which a witness testified ex parte that the 
defendant had killed the victim but omitted that he had done 
so in self-defense.167  Surely, Garrow argued, such a deposition, 
“not taken in my presence, and without the advantage of cross-
  
 163 King v. Woodcock, 1 Leach 500, 502, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 353 (1789); see also 
supra note 114.  As noted supra note 105, the reference to “contradicting” does not 
appear in the Old Bailey Sessions Papers report of the case. 
 164 It is true that presence would be advantageous to the prisoner even if he 
could not ask questions.  See Davies, supra note 5, at 172-73.  But the advantages 
Davies identifies seem unlikely to have been the ones the judge in Woodcock had in 
mind.  Absence might hamper a prisoner in preparing to contradict the witness at trial, 
but it would be strange to describe that as a denial of the opportunity to contradict.  
And while absence might also hamper a prisoner in defending himself at his committal 
examination, the deposition in Woodcock was not taken in connection with any 
committal hearing.  The judge’s use of the word “contradict” rather than “cross-
examine” might reflect an assumption that the prisoner at a committal hearing would 
not question the witness directly, but would “contradict” his account and rely on the 
magistrate to demand responses.  Cf. infra note 224.   
 165 King v. Dingler, 2 Leach 561, 562, 168 Eng. Rep. 383, 384 (1791). 
 166 Trial of George Dingler, Old Bailey Sessions Papers, Sept. 14, 1791, at 468. 
 167 Id. at 474.  
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examination, taken behind my back, not containing all the 
circumstances that he knows, but containing just so much as 
shall justify my commitment,” could not be admitted.168  Garrow 
then argued from the statutory text, as in Leach:  “The 
language of the statute is, that the Justice has nothing to do 
but with a man coming before him to be committed. . . . [This] 
was not in the course of a judicial examination; the prisoner 
was not present; the prisoner was not on his defence . . . .”169  
He then quoted at length from Woodcock.170 
A colloquy ensued.  The prosecution counsel inquired 
what had happened to the prisoner after his committal 
examination.171  The magistrate replied:  “After I had 
committed him once, I sent for him again, that he might have 
all the advantage he could make of it.”172  Garrow interjected:  
“Had he the advantage of suggesting the questions to the 
woman?”173  The magistrate conceded he had not.174  The 
prosecution counsel then argued that, whether or not the 
statute applied, the examination should be admitted as the 
best evidence available.175  But “[t]he examination [was] not 
allowed to be read.”176   
In Leach’s report, the court sustained Garrow’s 
objection “on the authority of the case cited” (Woodcock); we 
cannot be sure how much of Garrow’s argument the court 
accepted, although presumably it agreed with whatever was 
implicit in Woodcock itself .177  The Old Bailey Sessions Papers 
report suggests more strongly that inability to cross-examine 
was relevant to the decision, though it too is ambiguous.  
Whatever the basis for the court’s holding, however, the fact 
that Garrow believed there was a right to cross-examine at a 
committal hearing is significant in itself.  Garrow was the most 
  
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. at 475. 
 170 Id. at 475-76. 
 171 Id. at 476.  
 172 Trial of George Dingler, Old Bailey Sessions Papers, Sept. 14, 1791, at 468, 
476.  
 173 Id. (emphasis added). 
 174 Id.  
 175 Id. at 476-77.  
 176 Id. at 477. 
 177 King v. Dingler, 2 Leach 561, 563, 168 Eng. Rep. 383, 384 (1791). 
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famous criminal defense lawyer of his time.178  That he thought 
the right existed meant others probably did as well. 
In 1794, Webb essentially replicated the reasoning of 
Woodcock and Dingler without citing either decision.  The court 
held that the state’s committal statute “clearly implies the 
depositions to be read, must be taken in [the prisoner’s] 
presence”179—tracking the logic of Woodcock and Dingler that a 
committal statute authorizes testimony only where the 
prisoner is brought before the magistrate in custody.  And, just 
like Garrow in Dingler, the court then justified that presence 
requirement on the ground that it would afford an opportunity 
to cross-examine:  “[I]t is a rule of the common law, founded on 
natural justice, that no man shall be prejudiced by evidence 
which he had not the liberty to cross examine . . . .”180   
Treatises also endorsed the cross-examination rule to 
varying degrees.  A 1789 treatise cited Hawkins for the point 
that “[t]he examination of an informer, taken on oath in 
pursuance of the statutes of Philip & Mary, and subscribed by 
him, may be given in evidence” if the witness becomes 
unavailable.181  It then added:  “This shews the propriety and 
justice of permitting a prisoner by himself, or counsel to cross-
examine any witness produced against him, before the 
magistrate, though some justices have strenuously contended 
against the right.”182  
In 1795, Leach cited Woodcock and Dingler in his 
seventh edition of Hawkins for the point that “an examination 
of a person murderously wounded, taken by a justice of the 
peace . . . in the absence of the prisoner, cannot be read in 
evidence on the subsequent trial of the prisoner for murder, for 
it is taken extrajudicially, and not as the statutes of Philip and 
Mary direct, in a case where the prisoner is brought before him 
in custody, and he has the opportunity of contradicting or 
cross-examining as to the facts alledged.”183  In other words, the 
Marian statutes “direct[ed]” that the prisoner have the 
  
 178 See LANGBEIN, supra note 144, at 243 (“the dominant Old Bailey barrister 
of the day”); Landsman, supra note 76, at 551 (“one of the foremost counsel of the era”).  
See generally Beattie, Scales of Justice, supra note 149, at 236-47. 
 179 State v. Webb, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 103, 104 (Super. L. 1794); see also supra 
notes 39-42 and accompanying text. 
 180 Webb, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) at 104. 
 181 1 JOHN MORGAN, ESSAYS UPON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, NEW TRIALS, 
SPECIAL VERDICTS, TRIALS AT BAR, AND REPLEADERS 431 (London 1789).  
 182 Id.  I am indebted to Professor Davies for this reference. 
 183 4 HAWKINS (1795), supra note 11, at 423.  
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“opportunity of contradicting or cross-examining” adverse 
witnesses.  Later treatises and cases that conditioned 
admissibility on opportunity for cross-examination often 
similarly traced that requirement to Woodcock and Dingler.184 
Marian examinations remained a source of controversy.  
Importantly, however, the typical complaint was that the 
opportunity for cross-examination at a committal hearing was 
inadequate, not that there was no opportunity at all.  An 1806 
treatise, for example, criticized the rule of admissibility as 
“very unsatisfactory” because Marian depositions were “taken 
under circumstances, in which the adverse party had not a fair 
opportunity of cross examination, or in which such an 
examination, being unusual, could not reasonably be expected 
to have taken place.”185  Among other things, the hearing was 
limited to the issue of cause to commit rather than guilt, and 
“the combating of the evidence by professional assistance, or by 
adverse testimony, is frequently disallowed.”186  An 1824 
treatise advocated a strict unavailability rule because “[i]t is 
true that the prisoner has had the power to cross-examine the 
witness, but this was at a time and under circumstances very 
disadvantageous to the prisoner.”187  And a 1795 Virginia 
manual decried the rule of admissibility on the ground that 
“the accused party has not the same advantage of cross 
examination, which he would possess before a court, with the 
assistance of counsel.”188  These critiques are directed at the 
adequacy of the opportunity to cross-examine afforded by a 
committal hearing.  None claims the accused might be denied 
that opportunity altogether. 
C. Other Sources 
Marian depositions themselves provide little evidence of 
cross-examination.  That may be due in large part to the 
format:  The depositions merely recount witnesses’ testimony; 
  
 184 See People v. Restell, 3 Hill 289, 300 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842) (citing Woodcock 
and Dingler); 1 CHITTY, supra note 11, at 79 & n.(l) (citing Woodcock and Dingler); 2 
STARKIE, supra note 11, at *487-89 (citing Woodcock and Dingler); cf. Rex v. Smith, 
Holt 614, 615-16, 171 Eng. Rep. 357, 360 (1817) (apparently citing Radbourne); 
ARCHBOLD, supra note 11, at *85 (citing Radbourne). 
 185 Evans, supra note 11, at 232 (emphasis added). 
 186 Id. 
 187 2 STARKIE, supra note 11, at *487. 
 188 WILLIAM HENING, THE NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE 148 (Richmond, Nicolson 
1795) (emphasis added). 
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they do not transcribe questions and answers verbatim, nor do 
they report procedural colloquies between the magistrate and 
prisoner (or counsel).  There are a few instances of testimony 
that might conceivably be a product of cross-examination.  In 
one case, for example, an accomplice initially implicates the 
prisoners but then, in a passage of testimony apparently added 
afterward, minimizes their involvement.189  In other cases, 
witnesses admit not knowing particular facts in a manner 
arguably consistent with adverse questioning.190  Overall, 
however, the infrequency of such instances suggests that cross-
examination was still rarely attempted; that it was attempted 
but rarely permitted; or that it was conducted but the answers 
rarely transcribed.191  The deposition format provides no means 
  
 189 See Examination of Robert Hutton against William Street & John 
Maidwell, OBSP 1789 Jan/19 (Jan. 5, 1789) (first claiming that “William Street and 
John Maidwell came to his said Master, with two Waggons loaded with Sacks” (some of 
which were stolen), but later stating that “William Street was with his horses, and two 
men not present brought the said sacks to him, not Maidwell which last declaration is 
the Truth”).  The latter passage appears in compressed writing, as if it were inserted 
after the magistrate had already recorded the following witness’s testimony.   
 190 See Information of John Higgs against William Street & John Maidwell, 
OBSP 1789 Jan/30 (Jan. 5, 1789) (stating that he “saw him [a prisoner] go forward 
where Roots Waggon was but cannot say if he went there or not”); Information of 
Phillip Jones against Francis Fleming et al., OBSP 1789 Feb/60 (Jan. 28, 1789) 
(admitting he “does not know what became of the said Tire” that was stolen); 
Information of John Thompson against Francis Fleming et al., OBSP 1789 Feb/60 (Jan. 
28, 1789) (“[T]his Informant is not acquainted with the person of John Cumberledge [a 
prisoner] says he might have been in Company—Knows Holmes alias Shock [a 
prisoner] & thinks he was in his House does not recollect seeing Samuel Young alias 
Leggy [an accomplice] but says he might have been there as there was many persons”); 
Information of Daniel Adams against David Coleman, OBSP 1789 Ju/35 (May 6, 1789) 
(stating that an allegedly forged draft “was presented for payment but by whom this 
Informant cannot say”); Information of Fredreck Seabeck against Eleanor Hays, OBSP 
1789 Dec/54 (Nov. 28, 1789) (stating that “a Man and four Women came into the Room 
(but does not know who they were)”). 
 191 The third possibility cannot be discounted.  Although authorities generally 
advised the magistrate to record all testimony, exculpatory as well as inculpatory, see, 
e.g., 1 CHITTY, supra note 11, at 79; MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTREY JUSTICE 265 
(London 1618), the Marian statutes by their terms required the magistrate to take 
down only so much testimony “as shall be material to prove the Felony,” 2 & 3 Phil. & 
M., c. 10 (1555).  Selective transcription remained a source of controversy into the 
nineteenth century.  See People v. Restell, 3 Hill 289, 293, 304-05 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842) 
(holding that a magistrate erred where “neither the questions nor answers [during 
cross-examination] were put down, because [he] did not think it material to put them 
down”); Tharp v. State, 15 Ala. 749, 755 (1849) (chastising a magistrate for writing 
down only “so much [testimony] as he considered material”); cf. Evans, supra note 11, 
at 232 (“[I]t is a very hard measure, that an authentic record may be taken of the 
evidence which tends to criminate, while there is not an equal opportunity of 
preserving the materials of defence.”).  It may be that some magistrates would not 
record a witness’s responses to cross-examination unless they substantially 
undermined his other testimony.   
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of distinguishing among those possibilities.192  
Fortunately, other sources shed more light.193  
Particularly significant is an unreported case from 1780, 
Ayrton v. Addington.194  The case was a civil suit by Thomas 
Ayrton, an attorney, against William Addington, a magistrate 
presiding at Bow Street in London.195  The dispute arose from a 
felony robbery charge brought by a third man, Webb, against a 
fourth, Wilson.196  Wilson’s master had hired Ayrton to assist 
Wilson in his Marian committal hearing before Addington.197  
According to witnesses in the civil case, when Webb testified at 
the hearing, Ayrton sought to ask him “cross-questions” 
concerning the crime.198  Addington informed the attorney that 
this was “not a trial but an examination of prisoners” and that 
“he would not suffer him to examine,” although the attorney 
could suggest questions for the magistrate to ask.199  Ayrton 
replied that this was “very odd,” and “insisted he had a right to 
ask the [witness] any questions”—“the right as an Attorney to 
put any question for the benefit of his client.”200  Ayrton 
persisted in his cross-examination, interrupting Addington’s 
own questioning, and Addington ordered him removed.201 
Ayrton then sued Addington for assault and false 
imprisonment.202  In defense, Addington pled justification, 
claiming that Ayrton had interfered with his official duties.203  
The jury, however, returned a verdict for Ayrton, who 
  
 192 As explained supra note 85, I excluded from my deposition sample cases 
where the prisoner appeared pro se at trial, in an effort to find cases where the prisoner 
might also have been represented by counsel at the committal hearing (which seemed 
more likely to yield evidence of cross-examination).  Nevertheless, the depositions did 
not yield any evidence of lawyer involvement.  It is unclear whether that is because 
lawyers were rarely involved or because magistrates saw no need to note their 
involvement. 
 193 I owe many of the following references to John Beattie.   
 194 Ayrton v. Addington (Dec. 7, 1780), in 2 JAMES OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD 
MANUSCRIPTS AND THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 1023 
(1992). 
 195 Id. at 1023-24. 
 196 Id. at 1024.  
 197 Id.  
 198 Id.  
 199 Id. at 1025-26 (“[I]f he would put any question to him, & if he thought it 
proper, he would put it.”). 
 200 2 OLDHAM, supra note 194, at 1024-26. 
 201 Id. at 1026. 
 202 Id. at 1023. 
 203 Id. at 1024. 
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recovered one shilling in damages and £50 in court costs.204  
Implicit in the verdict, evidently, is the jury’s approval of 
Ayrton’s conduct at the hearing.  The case shows that, even in 
1780, a right to cross-examine witnesses at committal hearings 
was thought to exist not only by a member of the legal 
profession but by the public at large. 
Ayrton v. Addington is not the only instance of 
attempted cross-examination at a committal hearing.  Early 
press accounts reveal at least two others, though with mixed 
results.  In a 1774 case reported in the General Evening Post, 
John Matchem was charged with the robbery of two men, 
Lincon and Fidel.205  At the Bow Street committal hearing, 
Matchem was assisted by counsel who, “from the improbability 
of the prisoner being the offender, moved to cross-examine 
Lincon and Fidel.”206  According to the press account, however, 
“the Bench seemed unwilling to admit of such a proceeding.”207  
Lincon and Fidel testified at trial, so Matchem was not 
ultimately denied the opportunity to cross-examine.208  
Nevertheless, the case suggests that the right to cross-examine 
at a committal hearing was not firmly established at that time. 
By contrast, in a 1786 examination for arson reported in 
the Daily Universal Register, cross-examination not only was 
permitted, but resulted in the exoneration of the prisoners.209  
The principal witness at the hearing was the prisoners’ maid, 
who claimed they had directed her to set the fire.210  But “on her 
cross-examination by Mr. MacNally, who was counsel for the 
prisoners, she acknowledged that she had not accused her 
master and mistress, till after she was informed of her own 
danger [of being charged with the offense], and that to save 
herself she became evidence [for the prosecution].”211  The 
magistrates then discharged the prisoners for want of 
evidence.212 
  
 204 Id. at 1026.  The trial was significant enough to be reported in the British 
Mercury, although without any relevant details.  See BRIT. MERCURY & EVENING 
ADVERTISER, Dec. 9, 1780, at 4; BRIT. MERCURY & EVENING ADVERTISER, Dec. 11, 1780, 
at 3. 
 205 GEN. EVENING POST, June 14-16, 1774, at 3. 
 206 Id. 
 207 Id. 
 208 See Trial of John Mattsham, Old Bailey Sessions Papers, July 6, 1774, at 
243, 243-53. 
 209 DAILY UNIVERSAL REG., June 5, 1786, at 3. 
 210 Id.  
 211 Id. 
 212 Id. 
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Cross-examination at committal hearings was also a 
point of controversy in the colonies.  In 1766, colonists in New 
York complained to the authorities that “During the Course of 
the Examination of the Witnesses [a particular justice] would 
not admit any of the prisoners to ask or propose one Single 
Question to the Witnesses nor suffer anyone to do it in their 
Ste[a]d.”213  According to the complainants, this was one of 
“several violent and arbitrary steps . . . manifestly tending to 
the subversion of the invaluable privilege of English Subjects 
they conceive [o]ught not to pass unnoticed.”214 
By 1801, lawyer participation in committal hearings 
had become sufficiently common that a group of Lancaster 
magistrates sought legal advice on their rights.  Complaining 
that “[i]t frequently occurs upon the Examination of Persons 
charged with Felony, that Attornies are employed on their 
behalf to attend at their Examinations,” they posed a series of 
questions to five members of the bar, which were published 
that year with the answers in a pamphlet.215  The principal 
questions were whether attorney attendance at a committal 
hearing was by right or by discretion, and whether the attorney 
was entitled to copies of the examinations.216  Most respondents 
thought that attorney attendance was a matter of discretion 
and that copies of the examinations should not be given out.217  
As relevant here, however, the magistrates also inquired 
whether an attorney had a right “to cross examine the 
Witnesses as if on Trial.”218 
  
 213 JULIUS GOEBEL JR. & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN 
COLONIAL NEW YORK: A STUDY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1664-1776, at 635 (1944) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
 214 Id.  Davies cites the same page of this source for the point that “ ‘[t]he royal 
officials in New York do not seem to have admitted any right to cross-examination at a 
preliminary hearing,’ ” Davies, supra note 5, at 188 n.269 (quoting GOEBEL & 
NAUGHTON, supra note 213, at 635), but omits the fact that this refusal was the subject 
of colonial protest.   
 215 COPY OF CASE [SUBMITTED TO COUNSEL BY THE MAGISTRATES OF THE 
COUNTY OF LANCASTER] AND OPINIONS 3 (Manchester, Shelmerdine & Co. 1801) 
(British Library shelfmark T.1177.(1.); copy on file with author). 
 216 Id. at 5-7.  
 217 Id. at 5-18.  In 1822, the King’s Bench definitively held that there was no 
right to counsel at a committal hearing, see Cox v. Coleridge, 1 B. & C. 37, 107 Eng. 
Rep. 15 (K.B. 1822), although one judge noted that, “in practice, magistrates do permit, 
on many occasions, the presence of advocates for the parties accused,” id. at 49, 107 
Eng. Rep. at 19 (Abbott, C.J.), and another opined that “it may be very useful for a 
magistrate to grant [counsel] in many cases, and it is to be presumed that he will do so 
on all proper occasions,” id. at 51, 107 Eng. Rep. at 20 (Bayley, J.). 
 218 COPY OF CASE AND OPINIONS, supra note 215, at 5. 
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Three respondents addressed that issue.  The most 
expansive view was taken by a Mr. Topping, who stated: 
I conceive . . . that a Prisoner has a Right to have the Benefit of legal 
Advice upon his Examination if he chooses it . . . . [A]nd if a Prisoner 
has a Right to the Assistance of a professional Man upon his 
Examination before a Magistrate, it seems to me that such 
professional Person may examine the Witnesses produced against 
him, in doing this, if he conducts himself contemptuously or 
indecently towards the Magistrate in the Execution of his Duty, he is 
liable to Punishment.219 
At the other extreme was Mr. Serjeant Shepherd, who stated 
that a lawyer did not have “any right to cross examine the 
Witnesses.”220  Nevertheless, Shepherd explained: 
The best Advice I can give to the Magistrates, is the Rule I should 
lay down myself were I in the Commission; if an Attorney of 
Character and proper Demeanor, or a Counsel of Integrity, attended 
in order to give a Prisoner fair Advice, I should always permit it, and 
having heard him state the Question he wished to put on Cross-
examination, if it tended fairly to elucidate the Truth and protect the 
Prisoner, I should permit it; but I would not permit a general and 
desultory Cross-examination . . . .221 
Third was the ubiquitous William Garrow, whose response was 
ambiguous but seemed to assume that a lawyer permitted to 
attend should be allowed to cross-examine: 
There cannot exist a Right in any professional or other Person to 
interrupt the Magistrate, but I think it is incident to his Attendance 
that such Person should be permitted to advise the Prisoner as to his 
Conduct, nor do I think it would be proper to prevent such 
professional Persons making Minutes of what may pass, with respect 
to Cross-examination, I think the Magistrate may easily prevent this 
being extended to an inconvenient Degree, by observing that the 
Person is not now upon his Trial, that it is the Duty of the 
Magistrate to commit, that the Prisoner will have an Opportunity of 
making a full Defence upon his Trial, for which Occasion it will be 
for his Advantage to reserve himself.222 
  
 219 Id. at 16-17. 
 220 Id. at 10; cf. id. at 5-6 (Edward Law) (stating that the magistrate “may 
prescribe the Terms upon which alone he will allow” attorney attendance). 
 221 Id. at 11. 
 222 Id. at 15. 
2007] CONFRONTATION UNDER THE MARIAN STATUTES 541 
In sum, while the respondents differed over whether cross-
examination was by right or by discretion, all three agreed it 
should normally be allowed to some degree.223 
D. Conclusion 
The evidence in the preceding two sections suggests 
that, at the time of the framing, the right to cross-examine at a 
committal hearing was not firmly established, but nor was the 
absence of such a right firmly established.  Rather, there was 
disagreement over the point.  Most criminal lawyers probably 
thought the right existed; most magistrates probably thought it 
did not; other opinion was divided.  Cross-examination was 
probably still uncommon, so even those who thought the right 
existed likely expected only that the prisoner should be 
permitted to cross-examine, not that cross-examination would 
often actually occur.  Some thought the prisoner could not 
question witnesses directly, but could suggest questions for the 
magistrate to ask.224  Opinion was clearly shifting in favor of 
the right to cross-examine over time.  And some who thought 
there was no such right nevertheless thought an opportunity to 
cross-examine should be afforded as a matter of discretion.225   
  
 223 Furthermore, it is unclear to what extent the disagreement over counsel’s 
right to cross-examine reflected disagreement over the right to cross-examine or merely 
disagreement over the right to counsel.  When the King’s Bench held in 1822 that there 
was no right to counsel at a committal hearing, one judge clearly implied that the 
prisoner himself could still cross-examine.  See Cox v. Coleridge, 1 B. & C. 37, 54, 107 
Eng. Rep. 15, 21 (K.B. 1822) (Best, J.) (“It has been argued that a prisoner under 
examination should have the assistance of an attorney, to cross-examine the witnesses 
for the Crown, the depositions taken being, in certain cases, evidence against him, on 
account of his having had an opportunity for cross-examination.  But this does not 
mean cross-examining by counsel or attorney, for that formerly was not allowed to a 
prisoner, even on his trial.”); cf. id. at 51, 107 Eng. Rep. at 20 (Bayley, J.) (“[I]f the 
party be really innocent, he will himself be able to suggest to the magistrate all such 
matters as may tend to elucidate the truth.”).  
 224  Even at trial, cross-examination was sometimes intermediated by the 
judge.  See LANGBEIN, supra note 144, at 16.  Permitting the prisoner to suggest 
questions for the magistrate to ask therefore probably would have been viewed by 
many as substantially respecting any right to cross-examine.  
 225 These conclusions are largely consistent with other observations about 
pretrial practice in this era.  See BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS, supra note 84, at 
273-74 (stating that the cross-examination rule’s applicability to Marian depositions 
was “plainly at issue by 1750” and “accepted in its most general terms” by 1790 or soon 
thereafter); id. at 277 (“[B]y the end of the eighteenth century . . . [the] cross-
examination of the prosecution witnesses . . . had produced a new kind of magistrates’ 
hearing.”); id. at 280-81 (“The public pretrial enquiry [in the eighteenth century] also 
enlarged the possibility that a suspected offender, aided by a lawyer, might challenge 
the evidence upon which his commitment to trial would be based . . . .”); KING, supra 
note 84, at 97 (“[T]he eighteenth century witnessed a gradual growth in concern about 
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IV. CROSS-EXAMINATION – THE BROADER PICTURE 
Conflicting historical evidence poses problems for 
constitutional interpretation.  It transforms an effort to 
discover a single, universally accepted original meaning into an 
effort to determine which of two plausible meanings 
predominated.  In those circumstances, it makes sense to 
consider a broader range of historical evidence and the 
inferences reasonably drawn from that evidence.   
A. Consistency 
The Confrontation Clause is phrased in categorical 
terms and was designed to secure a procedure the Framers 
thought fundamental over a broad range of circumstances.226  In 
the face of conflicting direct evidence, therefore, it seems 
reasonable to assume that an interpretation that results in 
consistent and rational application over a range of 
circumstances is more likely to reflect original meaning than 
one that results in arbitrary distinctions.  Evidence concerning 
other forms of testimony beyond felony committal examinations 
is therefore relevant.  That evidence shows two things.  First, 
in a wide variety of circumstances, English law required that 
testimony be given in the presence of the accused.  Second, the 
principal justification for that requirement was that it would 
afford the accused an opportunity for cross-examination.  
Testimony at trial has long conformed to those 
principles.  Blackstone and Hale waxed eloquent about the 
English tradition of live oral testimony and identified the 
opportunity to propound “occasional questions” upon witnesses 
  
the rights of the accused at preliminary hearings . . . linked to, and perhaps caused by, 
the fact that lawyers began to appear at some summary hearings in this period.”); 
LANGBEIN, supra note 144, at 274-75 (noting that in the late eighteenth century, “[a]t 
least in London, the magistrate’s pretrial inquiry increasingly took on the trappings of 
a public hearing” and “became an occasion at which a defense lawyer could challenge 
the prosecution case”); Beattie, Scales of Justice, supra note 149, at 250 (noting the 
practice “by the end of the eighteenth century” of “allowing the accused to be 
represented at the preliminary hearing by counsel, who might cross-examine the 
evidence upon which a committal to trial might be based”).  Davies dismisses London 
as an “aberration,” Davies, supra note 5, at 201 n.306, but practices in London are 
uniquely relevant because they are the ones to which Americans studying in England 
would have been exposed.  See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text. 
 226 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .” (emphasis 
added)).  
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as a primary benefit of that tradition.227  Hawkins wrote 
broadly that “in Cases of Life no Evidence is to be given against 
a Prisoner but in his Presence,”228 and he justified the hearsay 
rule in part on the ground that hearsay denied the accused an 
“Opportunity of a cross Examination.”229  Finally, I noted above 
the centrality of cross-examination to a criminal defense 
lawyer’s work in the eighteenth century.230 
Opportunity for cross-examination was also a settled 
requirement in various pretrial contexts.  On the civil side, for 
example, it was clear that depositions could not otherwise be 
read.  According to Gilbert, it would be “against natural 
Justice” to admit a deposition against someone who “had not 
Liberty to cross-examine the Witnesses.”231  
A comparable rule applied to non-felony criminal cases.  
Whatever else Paine stands for, it clearly holds that 
opportunity to cross-examine is a necessary condition to the 
admissibility of a deposition in a misdemeanor case, even if the 
witness is dead.  The sole ground for decision in Modern, and 
the first of two alternative grounds in Comberbach and Holt, 
was that the prisoner was not present and so had lost the 
  
 227 See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 38, at 373 (1768) (“[T]he occasional 
questions of the judge, the jury, and the counsel, propounded to the witnesses on a 
sudden, will sift out the truth much better than a formal set of interrogatories 
previously penned and settled . . . .”); MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF 
THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 258 (London, Nutt 1713) (“[B]y this Course of personal 
and open Examination, there is Opportunity for all Persons concern’d, viz. The Judge, 
or any of the Jury, or Parties, or their Council or Attornies, to propound occasional 
Questions, which beats and bolts out the Truth much better than when the Witness 
only delivers a formal Series of his Knowledge without being interrogated . . . .”). 
 228 2 HAWKINS (1721), supra note 38, at 428 (footnote omitted). 
 229 Id. at 431 (“As to the second Particular, viz. How far Hearsay is Evidence:  
It seems agreed, That what a Stranger has been heard to say is in Strictness no 
Manner of Evidence either for or against a Prisoner, not only because it is not upon 
Oath, but also because the other Side hath no Opportunity of a cross 
Examination . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).  Throughout the eighteenth century, the 
principal justification for the hearsay rule remained absence of oath.  See LANGBEIN, 
supra note 144, at 245.  But cf. Thomas Y. Davies, Not “the Framers’ Design”: How the 
Framing-Era Ban Against Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawford-Davis “Testimonial” 
Formulation of the Scope of the Original Confrontation Clause, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 
(forthcoming 2007).  The admissibility of Marian depositions, however, was not 
typically analyzed as a hearsay issue.  Depositions were testimony, not hearsay; the 
question was how testimony must be given, not whether hearsay should be allowed.  
Cf. Davies, supra note 5, at 194. 
 230 See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text. 
 231 GILBERT (1754), supra note 76, at 47 (“A Deposition can’t be given in 
Evidence against any Person that was not Party to the Suit, and the Reason is, because 
he had not Liberty to cross-examine the Witnesses, and ’tis against natural Justice 
that a Man should be concluded in a Cause to which he never was a Party.”). 
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opportunity to cross-examine.232  The case has been cited 
throughout the centuries as standing for some cross-
examination rule.233  Cross-examination was not a sufficient 
condition to admissibility,234 and there is room for debate over 
Paine’s applicability to felonies,235 but neither qualification 
diminishes the case’s core holding. 
In treason cases, confrontation was secured by statute.  
A series of enactments dating back to the sixteenth century 
granted the defendant the right to confront witnesses “face to 
face” at his arraignment.236  The statutes did not mention a 
right to cross-examine.  But when Hale discussed them in his 
treatise, he justified the presence requirement on the ground 
that it would afford an opportunity for cross-examination.237   
Justices of the peace had summary jurisdiction to try 
certain minor criminal offenses, and a 1745 case seemed to 
allow depositions in such cases even if taken in the prisoner’s 
absence.238  In 1761, however, the King’s Bench effectively 
overruled that decision in Rex v. Vipont  and held unanimously 
  
 232 King v. Paine, 5 Mod. 163, 165, 87 Eng. Rep. 584, 585 (K.B. 1696) (“the 
defendant not being present when they were taken before the mayor, and so had lost 
the benefit of a cross-examination”); Rex v. Pain, Comb. 358, 359, 90 Eng. Rep. 527, 527 
(K.B. 1697) (“the defendant was not present when the examination was taken, so that 
he could not cross-examine him”); Rex v. Pain, Holt 294, 294, 90 Eng. Rep. 1062, 1062 
(K.B. 1697) (same). 
 233 See, e.g., 2 HAWKINS (1721), supra note 38, at 430; GILBERT (1754), supra 
note 76, at 100; King v. Eriswell, 3 T.R. 707, 722-23, 100 Eng. Rep. 815, 824 (K.B. 1790) 
(Kenyon, C.J.); ARCHBOLD, supra note 11, at *85; State v. Hill, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 607, 
610 (App. L. 1835); People v. Restell, 3 Hill 289, 300 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842); 3 WIGMORE, 
supra note 49, § 1364, at 22 & n.52. 
 234 Authority to examine was also required.  See supra Part I.B. 
 235 See supra Part I.B. 
 236 See, e.g., 13 Car. 2, c. 1, § 5 (1661) (“[N]o person or persons shall be indicted 
arraigned condemned convicted or attainted for any of the Treasons or Offences 
aforesaid unless the same Offender or Offenders be thereof accused by the Testimony 
and deposition of two lawful and credible Witnesses upon Oath which Witnesses at the 
time of the said Offender or Offenders’ arraignment shall be brought in person before 
him or them face to face and shall openly avow and maintain upon Oath what they 
have to say against him or them concerning the Treason or Offences contained in the 
said Indictment unless the party or parties arraigned shall willingly without violence 
confess the same.”).  Earlier treason statutes included an exception for dead witnesses 
(but not unavailable witnesses generally); that exception was deleted from later 
statutes.  Compare 5 & 6 Edw. 6, c. 11, § 9 (1552) (“if they be then living”), 1 & 2 Phil. 
& M., c. 10, § 11 (1554) (“if they be then living and within the Realm”), 1 Eliz., c. 1, § 21 
(1559) (“so many of them as shall be living and within this Realm”), and 1 Eliz., c. 5, 
§ 10 (1559) (“if they be then living”), with 13 Eliz., c. 1, § 9 (1571) (no death exception), 
and 13 Car. 2, c. 1, § 5 (1661) (no death exception).  
 237 1 HALE, supra note 23, at 306 (“[T]he statute requires, that [the witnesses] 
be produced upon the arraignment in the presence of the prisoner to the end that he 
may cross examine them.”). 
 238 See Rex v. Baker, 2 Strange 1240, 93 Eng. Rep. 1156 (K.B. 1745). 
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that testimony must be given in the prisoner’s presence.239  
Each of the judges justified that requirement on the ground 
that presence would ensure the defendant an opportunity to 
cross-examine.240  The court reaffirmed that rule in 1786.241  
This line of cases is particularly significant because the justices 
of the peace whom Vipont required to allow cross-examination 
in summary proceedings were the same justices who 
administered committal hearings under the Marian statutes.  
Langbein reports that examination techniques did not vary 
across those two contexts.242  In some cases, it might not even 
be clear at the outset whether an examination would terminate 
in summary conviction or felony committal.243  A right to cross-
examine in summary proceedings would not necessarily imply 
a right to cross-examine in committal hearings (only the former 
involves a determination of guilt).244  Nonetheless, cross-
examination would have seemed more natural in a committal 
hearing once magistrates had to allow cross-examination in 
their other proceedings. 
Even in felony cases, the Marian statutes applied only 
to committal examinations and coroners’ depositions245—not to 
other forms of testimony that might be generated, such as prior 
trial testimony,246 warrant applications,247 or preservation 
  
 239 2 Burr. 1163, 97 Eng. Rep. 767 (K.B. 1761). 
 240 Id. at 1165, 97 Eng. Rep. at 768 (Mansfield, J.) (“[E]vidence . . . must be 
given in the presence of the defendant, that he may have an opportunity of cross-
examining.”); id. at 1165, 97 Eng. Rep. at 769 (Denison, J.) (“The evidence must be 
given in the presence of the defendant, that he may have an opportunity to cross-
examine.”); id. at 1166, 97 Eng. Rep. at 769 (Wilmot, J.) (“The witnesses ought to be 
examined in the presence of the party accused; that he may have the benefit of cross-
examination.”).  The court did not expressly address unavailable witnesses. 
 241 See King v. Crowther, 1 T.R. 125, 127, 99 Eng. Rep. 1009, 1011 (K.B. 1786); 
see also id. at 126, 99 Eng. Rep. at 1010 (counsel’s argument) (“It was a principle in our 
law that the evidence must be given in the presence of the defendant, that he might 
have an opportunity of cross-examining the witness.”). 
 242 LANGBEIN, supra note 19, at 76-77, 93-95. 
 243 See KING, supra note 84, at 89 (noting that magistrates faced with felony 
accusations would sometimes summarily convict for minor offenses such as vagrancy 
rather than commit for trial). 
 244 See Cox v. Coleridge, 1 B. & C. 37, 50, 107 Eng. Rep. 15, 20 (K.B. 1822) 
(Bayley, J.) (making the same distinction as to the right to counsel); COPY OF CASE AND 
OPINIONS, supra note 215, at 10-14 (Shepherd) (same). 
 245 See supra notes 17-18; see also Davies, supra note 5, at 142 (acknowledging 
that “later treatise writers seem to have read Paine to also prohibit the use of a 
deposition of an unavailable witness in a felony trial if the deposition were improperly 
taken outside of Marian procedure”).   
 246 See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895); United States 
v. Wood, 28 F. Cas. 754 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1818) (No. 16,756); Summons v. State, 5 Ohio St. 
325, 342-43 (1856); State v. Atkins, 1 Tenn. (1 Overt.) 229 (1807); Finn v. 
Commonwealth, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 701, 708 (Gen. Ct. 1827); 2 HAWKINS (1721), supra 
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depositions.248  But what about coroners’ depositions?  Their 
admissibility had been settled since Lord Morly’s case in 
1666.249  And, as Professor Davies notes, the coroner’s inquest 
could occur before anyone was accused or arrested, so there is 
no obvious reason to assume the eventual defendant would be 
present.250   
Nevertheless, there is evidence that those who did 
attend the inquest could cross-examine witnesses.  In a 1742 
London trial, the defendant’s attorney testified: “[O]n the 4th of 
May, I went to Staines to attend the Coroner’s Jury; though, as 
I had not Time to enquire into the Fact, and prepare for Mr. 
Annesley’s Defence, I could do him but little Service more, than 
by cross examining the Witnesses for the Crown, and making 
Observations on their Evidence . . . .”251  Furthermore, in 1790, 
Chief Justice Kenyon in Eriswell explained the admissibility of 
coroners’ depositions on the ground that “the examination 
before the coroner is an inquest of office; it is a transaction of 
notoriety, to which every person has a right of access.”252  It 
  
note 38, at 430.  Davies criticizes Crawford ’s reliance on Atkins and Finn, see Davies, 
supra note 5, at 180 & n.235; Davies, supra note 10, at 626, but those cases do support 
the only proposition for which Crawford cited them—that some courts excluded prior 
testimony on confrontation grounds even though the defendant had an earlier 
opportunity to cross-examine.  See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004); 
Atkins, 1 Tenn. (1 Overt.) at 229 (prior trial testimony would “go a great length in 
overthrowing this wise provision of the Constitution”); id. (counsel’s argument) (relying 
on “the Constitution, which provided that the witnesses should be confronted with the 
accused”); Finn, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) at 708 (“In a civil action, if a witness who has been 
examined in a former trial between the same parties, and on the same issue, is since 
dead, what he swore to on the former trial, may be given in evidence, for the evidence 
was given on oath; and the party had an opportunity of cross-examining him.  But we 
cannot find that the rule has ever been allowed in a criminal case; indeed, it is said to 
be expressly otherwise.” (citations omitted)).  I agree the cases are not directly relevant 
here, because they involved prior trial testimony, not Marian depositions.  
 247 See, e.g., Collier v. State, 13 Ark. 676, 677 (1853); State v. Hill, 20 S.C.L. (2 
Hill) 607, 608 (App. L. 1835). 
 248 See, e.g., People v. Restell, 3 Hill 289, 293 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842); King v. 
Dingler, 2 Leach 561, 168 Eng. Rep. 383 (1791); King v. Woodcock, 1 Leach 500, 168 
Eng. Rep. 352 (1789); Case of Thatcher & Waller, T. Jones 53, 84 Eng. Rep. 1143 (K.B. 
1676). 
 249 See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text. 
 250 Davies, supra note 5, at 171-72.  At most, of course, Davies’ argument 
suggests only that there was no cross-examination rule for coroners’ depositions.  It has 
no bearing on the cross-examination rule applicable to committal examinations, which 
derived from the particular statutory text governing committal procedure.  See supra 
notes 125-27 and accompanying text. 
 251 Trial of James Annesley, Old Bailey Sessions Papers, July 15, 1742, at 1, 
25. 
 252 King v. Eriswell, 3 T.R. 707, 722, 100 Eng. Rep. 815, 824 (K.B. 1790) 
(Kenyon, C.J.); see also 2 STARKIE, supra note 11, at *492 (“The only plausible ground 
upon which such a distinction [between coroners’ depositions and committal 
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thus appears that coroners’ depositions were admissible on the 
theory that, since inquests were notorious proceedings of which 
everyone was presumed to be aware, those who failed to show 
up to cross-examine had simply neglected their rights.   
American cases refused to admit coroners’ depositions, 
declining to follow English precedents or making only half-
hearted attempts to reconcile them.253  One stated that, 
whatever the English rule, the use of such ex parte depositions 
had “never been permitted in this country.”254  The leading case 
asked of defendants rhetorically: “[S]hall they all be assumed 
per leges [i.e., by operation of law], to have neglected, though 
absent, the time of cross-examination?  Because our Act is 
general for all inquests, the examination public, and of high 
respectability?  On the contrary, is there not too much of mere 
formula, if not fiction, in such a notion?”255  The perceived 
English rule these cases rejected thus did not condone ex parte 
testimony.  Rather, it presumed opportunity to cross-examine 
from the notoriety of the proceeding.  That presumption was 
not very realistic, so the practical effect was to admit ex parte 
depositions.256  But the very fact that English authorities 
rationalized that result speaks volumes about the legal 
landscape. 
In a wide variety of contexts, therefore, admissibility 
depended on presence, and presence was relevant because it 
afforded an opportunity to cross-examine.  Principles of 
consistency therefore favor a cross-examination requirement 
for Marian depositions.  Furthermore, the fact that opportunity 
to cross-examine was routinely identified as the reason 
presence was important—even when the governing statute said 
nothing about cross-examination—is instructive.  Some sources 
conditioned the admissibility of a Marian examination on the 
  
examinations] can be supported, seems to be this, that a proceeding before the coroner 
is a matter so notorious, that every one may be presumed to have notice of it, and 
consequently to have had an opportunity of cross-examining the witness.  This however 
is a reason far from satisfactory.”). 
 253 See State v. Campbell, 30 S.C.L. (1 Rich.) 124, 131-32 (App. L. 1844); State 
v. Houser, 26 Mo. 431, 436 (1858); People v. Restell, 3 Hill 289, 297 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1842); State v. Hill, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 607, 610 (App. L. 1835).   
 254 Houser, 26 Mo. at 436.   
 255 Campbell, 30 S.C.L. (1 Rich.) at 129. 
 256 See, e.g., PEAKE (1808), supra note 47, at 64 n.(m) (“[T]he practice has been 
to admit [coroners’ depositions] after the death of the witness, without inquiry whether 
the party was present or not . . . .”); cf. King v. Eriswell, 3 T.R. 707, 710 n.(c), 100 Eng. 
Rep. 815, 817 n.(c) (K.B. 1790) (reporter’s note 1797) (“Nor [are committal depositions 
admissible] since that statute, unless the party accused be present, though an 
examination before a coroner is . . . .”). 
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prisoner’s presence without mentioning cross-examination.257  
This background suggests that opportunity to cross-examine 
may nevertheless have been an implicit justification for the 
presence requirement stated in those sources.258   
B. Subsequent History 
For the most part, the preceding sections have 
examined only sources roughly contemporaneous with the 
framing or older, referring to later materials only to shed light 
on specific earlier ones.  As noted at the outset, however, the 
more general subsequent history is quite one-sided.  Between 
1795 and 1824, at least eleven English treatises or case reports 
conditioned admissibility on presence or opportunity for cross-
examination; between 1794 and 1858, at least sixteen reported 
American cases did so.259  By contrast, I am not aware of any 
English source from later than the early 1790s suggesting that 
a Marian committal examination would be admissible even if 
taken ex parte.  And I have not found a single reported case 
from any American jurisdiction—not one—that has ever made 
that claim.  That subsequent history is relevant to original 
meaning.  Subsequent conduct in conformity with a particular 
interpretation of a contract is evidence of the parties’ intent; no 
less is true of the Constitution.   
Professor Davies deems later sources irrelevant because 
“conditions changed rapidly during the early decades of the 
Republic.”260  Clearly, however, that goes to weight rather than 
admissibility.  How committal examinations were conducted in, 
say, 1821—and what conditions attached to their 
admissibility—is plainly some evidence of practices and legal 
rules a few decades earlier.  Later evidence might reflect new 
developments instead, but that sort of uncertainty is inherent 
in any source not precisely contemporaneous with the framing:  
Post-framing evidence might reflect post-framing 
  
 257 See various authorities cited supra notes 11-13. 
 258 In contexts not involving formal depositions, it may be less likely that 
presence was relevant in order to afford an opportunity to cross-examine.  For example, 
courts sometimes conditioned admissibility of relatively informal hearsay statements 
on the prisoner’s presence.  See, e.g., Trial of John Ilford, Old Bailey Sessions Papers, 
Dec. 8, 1757, at 10, 10 (accusatory statement to private party); Trial of Thomas Fitzroy, 
Old Bailey Sessions Papers, Sept. 16, 1801, at 525, 526 (statements to constable).  
Cross-examination may have been very difficult in those circumstances.  I owe these 
two references to Richard Friedman. 
 259 See sources cited supra notes 11-13. 
 260 Davies, supra note 5, at 179. 
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developments, but pre-framing evidence might be obsolete.  
The historical record should be evaluated as a whole, giving 
most weight to sources closest to the framing—not by ignoring 
subsequent authorities entirely because of the mere possibility 
that they might reflect subsequent developments.261 
As to post-framing English sources, little needs to be 
added to what I have already said with respect to Radbourne, 
Woodcock, and Dingler.262  If an 1821 American source is 
relevant to American meaning in 1789, then Ayrton’s 1780 civil 
suit is relevant to English meaning in 1748; Garrow’s 1791 
argument is relevant to English meaning in 1759; and the 1801 
responses to the Lancaster magistrates’ queries are relevant to 
English meaning in 1769.  More than a hundred American 
lawyers trained in London over that period, observing English 
practices and absorbing English conceptions of legal rights.  
Crawford ’s reliance on post-framing authorities is 
hardly novel.  Justices Scalia and Thomas routinely rely on 
comparable or later American authorities to interpret the 
Constitution.  In Apprendi v. New Jersey, for example, Justice 
Thomas derived the original meaning of the jury-trial right by 
examining state cases from “the founding to roughly the end of 
the Civil War, . . . particularly from the 1840’s on,” and 
continued his review through the end of the nineteenth 
century.263  Other opinions relying heavily on state cases from 
that era include Justice Thomas’s opinion for the Court in 
Wilson v. Arkansas (knock and announce),264 Justice Scalia’s 
plurality in Harmelin v. Michigan (cruel and unusual 
punishment),265 and Justice Scalia’s dissents in County of 
Riverside v. McLaughlin (pretrial detention)266 and Grady v. 
Corbin (double jeopardy).267  Still further examples abound.268   
  
 261 Davies also argues that later American decisions might reflect post-
framing English developments.  See id. at 180 n.234.  Even if so, American courts chose 
to follow those developments as consistent with their own understanding of the law.   
 262 See supra notes 119-27 and accompanying text. 
 263 530 U.S. 466, 501-18 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 264 514 U.S. 927, 933 (1995) (Thomas, J.). 
 265 501 U.S. 957, 982-85 (1991) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). 
 266 500 U.S. 44, 61-62 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 267 495 U.S. 508, 533-35 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 268 See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301-02 (2004) (Scalia, J.) 
(citing 1872 treatise to construe jury-trial right); Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 
615, 629-31 & n.2 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (citing late nineteenth-
century cases to construe search-incident-to-arrest authority under Fourth 
Amendment); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(citing late nineteenth-century treatise to interpret Fourth Amendment); United States 
v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 516-19 (1995) (Scalia, J.) (citing late nineteenth-century cases 
 
550 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:2 
Justices Scalia and Thomas also routinely rely on post-
framing English authorities.269  Leach’s Crown Cases has been 
cited as constitutional authority throughout the Court’s 
history.270  Mattox, the Court’s seminal 1895 Confrontation 
Clause decision, relied on Radbourne itself.271  While Davies 
would presumably dismiss every one of these citations as an 
invalid use of historical evidence, the more reasonable 
  
to establish absence of exception to jury-trial right); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 
602, 626 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (citing 1882 treatise to interpret Eighth 
Amendment); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 215 & nn.1-2 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in judgment) (citing late nineteenth-century statutes to interpret First 
Amendment); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 154 n.4 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(citing late nineteenth-century case on shackling); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 
621, 624 (1991) (Scalia, J.) (citing 1862 case to interpret Fourth Amendment); Sun Oil 
Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 724 (1988) (Scalia, J.) (citing cases through 1831 to 
interpret Full Faith and Credit Clause); cf. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 
345 (1998) (Kennedy, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J., et al.) (citing late nineteenth-
century cases to interpret Excessive Fines Clause).   
 269 See, e.g., Thornton, 541 U.S. at 629-31 & n.2 (Scalia, J., concurring in 
judgment) (citing nineteenth-century English cases to interpret search-incident-to-
arrest authority under Fourth Amendment); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 338, 342 
(2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 1794 English statute to interpret Suspension 
Clause; disputing significance of 1811 English case but not questioning timeliness); 
United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 50 n.1 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing 
1808 English case to interpret Self-Incrimination Clause); Carter, 525 U.S. at 94 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (citing 1815 English case to interpret Fourth Amendment); 
Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 515-16 (Scalia, J.) (citing nineteenth-century English cases to 
establish absence of exception to jury-trial right); Wilson, 514 U.S. at 935-36 (Thomas, 
J.) (citing early nineteenth-century English cases to interpret Fourth Amendment 
knock-and-announce rule); McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 61 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 
1825 English case to interpret pretrial detention authority under Fourth Amendment); 
Grady, 495 U.S. at 532-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 1796 English case to interpret 
Double Jeopardy Clause); cf. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 504-05 (2004) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (citing twentieth-century English case on common-law territorial scope of 
the writ);  Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 644-45 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting, 
joined by Scalia and Thomas, JJ.) (citing 1829 English statute to interpret Ex Post 
Facto Clause); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J.) 
(citing nineteenth-century English cases to interpret Self-Incrimination Clause); Grupo 
Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 327-29 & n.10 
(1999) (Scalia, J.) (citing nineteenth- and twentieth-century English cases on common-
law equity jurisdiction).  Not included are countless citations to nineteenth-century 
editions of earlier English works. 
 270 See Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 626 (2005); id. at 639 n.2 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting); Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 433; Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 127 (1999) 
(plurality); Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 356 (1996); United States v. Dixon, 509 
U.S. 688, 710 (1993); Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446-47 (1992); Grady, 495 
U.S. at 532 (Scalia, J., dissenting); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 673 (1984) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 463 n.1 (1970) 
(Burger, J., dissenting); Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 59 (1899); Bram v. United 
States, 168 U.S. 532, 547, 551 (1897); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 240 
(1895); Holden v. Minnesota, 137 U.S. 483, 496 (1890); In re Palliser, 136 U.S. 257, 265-
66 (1890); Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 422-23 (1885); Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 
509, 530 (1878) (Clifford, J., dissenting); Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1855); cf. 
Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 55 (1895); Hopt v. People, 110 U.S. 574, 584 (1884). 
 271 Mattox, 156 U.S. at 240. 
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inference is that his definition of relevant evidence is too 
narrow. 
While the pre-framing evidence is ambiguous in this 
case, the post-framing evidence is devastating.  Every reported 
American decision to address the issue conditioned the 
admissibility of a committal examination on presence, and in 
most cases expressly on opportunity to cross-examine.272  None 
of those cases contains the slightest hint that it is departing 
from past practice or creating new law; indeed, with one 
exception,273 none even shows any awareness that the point was 
ever debatable in England.  Furthermore, none of the cases 
actually excluded a committal examination taken ex parte.  
Rather, they all involved either (1) an attempt by a defendant 
to exclude a committal examination even though he was 
present and had an opportunity to cross-examine,274 or (2) an 
attempt by a prosecutor to admit an ex parte deposition that 
was not a committal examination.275  If framing-era criminal 
defendants were routinely sequestered or prohibited to ask 
questions at their own committal hearings, surely there would 
be some reported case either excluding a committal deposition 
or admitting it over the objection that it was taken ex parte.  
That there is neither is compelling evidence that committal 
examinations were routinely taken in a manner that respected 
the prisoner’s right to confrontation.  Only when a prosecutor 
sought to invoke a committal statute in a non-committal 
context, or when a prisoner sought to exclude even a properly 
taken committal deposition, did it become necessary to confirm 
the cross-examination rule. 
  
 272 See cases cited supra note 13. 
 273 State v. Hill, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 607, 609 (App. L. 1835) (noting a “great 
diversity of opinion on the question” and citing Eriswell). 
 274 See United States v. Macomb, 26 F. Cas. 1132, 1132 (C.C.D. Ill. 1851) (No. 
15,702); Davis v. State, 17 Ala. 354, 356 (1850); Tharp v. State, 15 Ala. 749, 750 (1849); 
Commonwealth v. Richards, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 434, 437 (1836); State v. Houser, 26 
Mo. 431, 438 (1858); State v. McO’Blenis, 24 Mo. 402, 402-03 (1857); People v. Restell, 3 
Hill 289, 292-93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842); State v. Moody, 3 N.C. (2 Hayw.) 31, 31-32 
(Super. L. 1798); Kendrick v. State, 29 Tenn. (10 Hum.) 479, 484, 487 (1850); Bostick v. 
State, 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 344, 344 (1842); Johnston v. State, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 58, 58 
(1821); State v. Hooker, 17 Vt. 658, 662 (1845).  
 275 See Collier v. State, 13 Ark. 676, 677 (1853) (warrant application); State v. 
Webb, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 103 (Super. L. 1794) (unclear, but apparently not a committal 
examination, see Davies, supra note 5, at 181 & n.237); State v. Campbell, 30 S.C.L. (1 
Rich.) 124, 124-25 (App. L. 1844) (coroner’s deposition); Hill, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) at 608 
(warrant application). 
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C. Text 
Finally, we should not lose sight of what the Sixth 
Amendment actually says:  “In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him . . . .”276  As Professor Davies observes, 
the Framers clearly would have understood those who gave 
sworn testimony against a prisoner at his committal hearing to 
be “witnesses against him” within the meaning of that clause.277  
Indeed, the full phrase “accusers and witnesses” that appeared 
in some state confrontation clauses278 and in Madison’s original 
draft of the federal clause279 was the same phrase Hale used to 
describe Marian deponents.280 
Taking a Marian deposition outside the presence of the 
prisoner and then using that ex parte deposition to convict him 
at trial deprives the defendant of the opportunity “to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him” under any 
conceivable literal interpretation of those words.  And denying 
the prisoner the opportunity to question the witness deprives 
him of the principal benefit that the English confrontational 
manner of giving testimony was thought to secure.  By 
contrast, if admissibility is subject to the appropriate 
conditions, “[t]he substance of the constitutional protection is 
preserved to the prisoner in the advantage he has once had of 
seeing the witness face to face, and of subjecting him to the 
ordeal of a cross-examination.”281  Those are not irrelevant 
considerations. 
Professor Davies declines to undertake any textual 
parsing of the Confrontation Clause because it “drew upon 
settled understandings of legal rights.”282  The “right . . . to be 
  
 276 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 277 Davies, supra note 5, at 193. 
 278 See Virginia Declaration of Rights § 8 (1776) (“[I]n all capital or criminal 
prosecutions a man hath a right . . . to be confronted with the accusers and 
witnesses . . . .”), reprinted in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 234, 235 (1971); Delaware Declaration of Rights § 14 (1776) 
(“[I]n all prosecutions for criminal offences, every man hath a right . . . to be confronted 
with the accusers or witnesses . . . .”), reprinted in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra, at 276, 278. 
 279 See SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 423 (Richard Perry & John Cooper eds., 
rev. ed. 1978) (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be 
confronted with his accusers, and the witnesses against him . . . .”). 
 280 See 2 HALE, supra note 23, at 284 (directing magistrates to take 
“informations of the accusers and witnesses”); id. at 52 (similar).  
 281 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895). 
 282 Davies, supra note 5, at 105 n.1. 
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confronted with the witnesses against him,” in other words, 
secures only whatever content that “right” had at common law.  
That interpretive method is sound so far as it goes, but it 
presumes the existence of a “settled understanding” on which 
to operate.  If nothing else, this Article has shown that the 
admissibility of ex parte committal examinations was far from 
settled. 
The Framers were invoking what they understood to be 
pre-existing legal rights, but they were also using the English 
language to describe those rights; and when the content of the 
right invoked is unclear or was disputed, we should not ignore 
their description of it.  It is one thing to read a common-law 
exception into the text where that exception was 
noncontroversial in England and consistently followed in 
America after the framing (as, for example, with dying 
declarations283).  But it is quite another where the exception 
was disputed in England and consistently rejected here. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Throughout the eighteenth century, it was settled law 
that a Marian deposition was admissible at trial if the witness 
was dead, too sick to travel, or kept away by the accused.  
Nevertheless, Marian procedure was evolving.  The 
development was not that courts began excluding depositions 
where they once admitted them, but that Marian procedure 
came to be (or be seen as) consistent with the cross-
examination rule.  It would have been strange, at the outset of 
the century, to say that “[t]he substance of the constitutional 
protection is preserved to the prisoner”284 in the advantages he 
enjoyed at Marian pretrial.  Not so at the end. 
The presence of the prisoner was clearly a routine 
feature of Marian committal practice.  Presence was a natural 
consequence of the procedure the statutes contemplated—
indeed, of any committal procedure.  That routine feature 
hardened into a procedural right, so that an examination 
conducted in the prisoner’s absence was deemed outside the 
statutes and so not admissible.  How long before the framing 
that occurred is hard to say, since there was little occasion to 
consider the matter until prosecutors tried to invoke the 
  
 283 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.6 (2004); 3 WIGMORE, supra 
note 49, §§ 1430-1452, at 160-87. 
 284 Mattox, 156 U.S. at 244. 
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statutes to admit depositions unrelated to magistrates’ 
statutory committal function. 
Whether a prisoner could cross-examine witnesses at 
his committal hearing was probably an almost entirely 
theoretical question until the second half of the eighteenth 
century.  It was put into relief once magistrates began 
exercising an extra-statutory power of discharge (increasing 
the incentive to test the prosecutor’s case) and lawyers began 
participating (increasing the likelihood that any opportunity to 
cross-examine would be exploited).  The idea that a prisoner 
had the right to cross-examine witnesses at his committal 
hearing gained currency before the framing, but some 
magistrates resisted, and the point was still disputed when the 
Confrontation Clause was framed.285   
That said, there are compelling reasons to think the 
framing generation’s views on this point coincided more with 
Garrow’s than with Buller’s.286  The cross-examination rule was 
followed in a wide range of other contexts.  Courts across the 
United States uniformly endorsed it after the framing.  And the 
rule is more consistent with the text of the Confrontation 
Clause itself.   
Crawford ’s cross-examination rule is therefore on solid 
ground.287  If the opinion is to be faulted for anything, it is only 
for understating the importance of physical presence, not for 
overstating the importance of cross-examination.288  At the 
  
 285 I therefore disagree with Landsman’s claim that “[b]efore the early 
nineteenth century, the most that was ever called for was physical confrontation 
between witness and accused.”  Landsman, supra note 76, at 599.  The cross-
examination rule may have been settled in the nineteenth century, but it originated in 
the eighteenth.  
 286 Compare supra notes 165-78 and accompanying text with supra notes 128-
44 and accompanying text. 
 287 Professor Davies thinks I advocate a position much weaker than Justice 
Scalia’s in Crawford.  See Davies, supra note 10, at 573-77.  But even Justice Scalia 
acknowledged “doubts” over whether the Marian statutes prescribed an exception to 
the common-law cross-examination rule, citing among other authorities Lofft’s 1791 
edition of Gilbert and Grose and Kenyon’s 1790 opinions in Eriswell.  See Crawford, 
541 U.S. at 46.  Admittedly, near the end of a lengthy footnote responding to Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, the opinion also states that three particular sources (Hale, 
Westbeer, and Eriswell) did not show that the law in 1791 was “unsettled.”  Id. at 55 
n.5.  To the extent that sentence implies that the question was settled beyond all 
dispute, I agree it takes a position stronger than the one I take here.  I also concede 
that, whatever its demerits, Buller’s opinion in Eriswell does show that the issue was 
still debated.  But I do not think those differences are as substantial as Davies makes 
them out to be.  A framing-era legal rule need not be settled beyond dispute to be 
relevant to original meaning, so long as there are adequate reasons to believe the 
Framers would have resolved the dispute a particular way.  
 288 Cf. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990).   
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framing, the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him” was the right to be testified against in one’s presence; 
opportunity for cross-examination was not so much the 
confrontation right itself as the reason that right was secured 
(at least the principal one).  That formulation changed over 
time so that, by 1824, Starkie could write simply that “the 
depositions of witnesses before magistrates, under the statutes 
of Philip and Mary, are not evidence, unless the prisoner had 
an opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses,” without even 
mentioning presence.289  The change, however, was more of 
emphasis than of substance. 
Professor Davies’ article is objectionable, not because of 
the contrary conclusion he reaches, but because of his repeated 
dismissals of the opposing view as historical “fiction”—at one 
point going so far as to compare Justice Scalia’s opinion to 
“junk science.”290  Davies’ conclusion, however, rests critically 
on his premise that all English sources published after 1789 
and all American sources published more than a few years 
after 1789 are irrelevant to original meaning; relax either of 
those two constraints and his argument unravels.  Even if 
those novel constraints were defensible (which I doubt), the 
fact that Justice Scalia took a somewhat broader view of the 
post-framing evidence relevant to original meaning hardly 
makes his opinion “fictional.”291   
One suspects Davies chose the rhetorical style he did to 
justify his more general critique of originalism.  It was not 
enough for him to show that Crawford  resolved a debatable 
point over which reasonable legal historians could disagree; he 
had to show that Crawford ’s history was so flawed that it was 
not even worth undertaking the inquiry.  With respect, I do not 
believe he made that case; but I will let readers judge for 
themselves. 
  
 289 1 STARKIE, supra note 11, at *96.  Later formulations of the confrontation 
right likewise emphasized cross-examination over presence.  See, e.g., 3 WIGMORE, 
supra note 49, § 1397, at 100 (“There never was at common law any recognized right to 
an indispensable thing called Confrontation as distinguished from Cross-examination.” 
(emphasis omitted)); FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). 
 290 Davies, supra note 5, at 216. 
 291 I have focused this Article on the core issue of the cross-examination rule’s 
applicability to Marian examinations, rather than attempting to respond 
comprehensively to all of Davies’ other alleged “errors.”  That limitation should not be 
taken as acquiescence.  In particular, I have not addressed the validity of Crawford ’s 
testimonial/nontestimonial distinction, because that topic has already been well 
addressed by other authors.  See, e.g., Richard Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for 
Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011 (1998).   
